The Chicago Housing Authority's Plan for Transformation:  
What Does the Research Show So Far?  

Lawrence J. Vale and Erin Graves  
Department of Urban Studies and Planning  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology  

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FINAL REPORT
The Chicago Housing Authority's Plan for Transformation:
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Dr. Lawrence J. Vale
Ford Professor of Urban Design and Planning
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Dr. Erin Graves
Post-doctoral Research Associate
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Preface

For many years, the MacArthur Foundation’s investments in its home city have included sizable commitments to Chicago’s neighborhoods and their residents. However, the Plan for Transformation, a historic and ambitious initiative to rehabilitate or replace 25,000 units of Chicago’s most distressed public housing, presented an opportunity for the Foundation to provide strategic and civic support on an unprecedented scale.

When the Plan was announced in 1999 under the leadership of Mayor Richard M. Daley, it was clear that it was ambitious. Because of its scale and scope, it would always be a work in progress, with the potential to improve living conditions for thousands of Chicagoans and to create a more effective set of policies and practices for urban public housing. As expected, it generated many research questions and the interest of scholars and observers from a wide range of disciplines: sociology, urban planning, social service, public administration. Early on, the Foundation recognized the value of rigorous research from multiple perspectives and it continues to invest in relevant studies.

The Plan for Transformation is now in its tenth year of implementation. The Foundation commissioned this review of research to provide a snapshot of collected findings from the early years of the Plan. It relies on qualitative and quantitative data collected from 1999 through 2007; by its nature, it is a retrospective look at many of the early designs, plans, programs, and policies and it does not necessarily reflect the Plan’s implementation today.

Dr. Lawrence J. Vale and his colleagues at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have done an admirable job in distilling key findings from this large body of research, and also have identified areas where more work must be done before it will be possible to understand the full impact of The Plan on the city and its residents.

Julia Stasch
Vice President, US Programs
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
ABSTRACT

As the Chicago Housing Authority's "Plan for Transformation" reached its 10th anniversary, a substantial body of research has emerged to assess the city's major effort to redevelop its public housing stock and improve the lives of the public housing population. This report is not a formal evaluation of the Plan for Transformation itself, but is instead a review of more than eighty pieces of published literature about the Plan. It is intended to provide readers with a critical overview of the processes and the outcomes affecting families and neighborhoods impacted by the Plan.

The research on the Plan for Transformation cited in this report includes published academic research, as well as research reports and white papers by independent research institutes, civic organizations and officially appointed independent monitors, but does not reference the extensive coverage by journalists. The researchers cited have employed a variety of methods to investigate the Plan for Transformation and the output to date varies in its scope: the timeframes of the data collection vary from a single sample year to seven years. Some datasets purport to include the entire CHA population affected by the Plan for Transformation, while others include only a subset of residents found in a single development. The data analysis varies in its quality as well. Due to the inevitable time lags between research and publication, much of this research covers the earliest phases of the Plan. As such, it does not fully reflect more recent changes (whether positive or negative), nor is the published research fully able to take account of the effects of the larger economic downturn after 2008.

The report begins with an overview of the Plan for Transformation (Section One) and a description of the studies reviewed (Section Two). Section Three then jumps ahead to consider the extent of consensus about research findings revealed by the overall body of research work about the Plan for Transformation, work that is then discussed in greater detail in sections Four, Five and Six. Section Three separates discussion of research into three categories: a category emphasizing the processes associated with implementation of the Plan; a category focusing on the impact of the Plan on the socio-economic lives of residents; and a category focused on the places created or renovated as the result of the Plan. Section Three also discusses areas of ongoing debate that need follow-on study, as well as untapped areas of importance that require new research efforts. Recognizing that the Plan for Transformation is still a work in progress, this analysis does not attempt an overall assessment of the Plan for Transformation to date.

Sections Four, Five and Six of this report step back to provide more detailed assessment of the literature about Plan implementation, tenant outcomes, and neighborhood quality that were summarized in Section Three. Section Four addresses the research about how the Plan for Transformation has been implemented. Taken as a whole, this body of work generally shows that the early years of implementation were marked by challenges and setbacks, while in more recent years the CHA has redoubled its efforts and launched more effective programs. The research includes investigations of the implementation of resident relocation to 1) existing CHA properties, 2) the private market using Housing Choice Vouchers and 3) mixed income developments. There has also been research on the counseling efforts and the attempts to
assist the neediest residents, seen by several researchers as showing marked improvement in recent years. Scholars have also reviewed how the redevelopment has been altered by court action, often to the benefit of public housing residents.

Section Five reviews research focused on outcomes for original public housing tenants, known as 10-1-1999 residents. Several studies assess these and other socio-economic outcomes for still active CHA tenants, such as employment, mental health, personal safety and educational effects, as well as the special challenges faced by the ‘hard-to-house’ and by former CHA squatters. The research suggests that outcomes for tenants vary by their type of destination housing. Those using Housing Choice Vouchers have experienced many gains while those remaining in non-rehabbed public housing have not and may, in fact, find their situation worsening.

Section Six focuses on the quality of the places impacted by the Plan for Transformation. The research encompasses both former project sites and sites of relocation that the CHA residents lived in after the Plan was implemented. These inquiries investigate safety and security, the quality of the housing, and the poverty level and racial make-up of these communities. This section also reviews research on other neighborhood issues such as the level of economic growth and affordability for affected neighborhoods and the impacts on crime stemming from the redevelopment and relocation of 10-1-1999 residents. The research reported in this section suggests that residents generally enjoy higher quality housing but the findings about neighborhood poverty levels and other socio-economic indicators are mixed.

Finally, Section Seven provides a bibliographical lists of the studies referenced in this report.
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

Historic in its scope and perhaps in its scrutiny, the Chicago Housing Authority's Plan for Transformation—a plan to redevelop and, more fundamentally, to reformulate, the city’s public housing—has attracted the attention of policymakers, researchers, journalists and the general public, both in Chicago and nationwide. According to the CHA, "It is the largest, most ambitious redevelopment effort of public housing in the United States, with the goal of rehabilitating or redeveloping the entire stock of public housing in Chicago." Upon completion of the Plan for Transformation, the CHA aims to have renovated or built 25,000 units of housing, including units for families in new mixed-income developments, in renovated scattered-site developments and in rehabilitated traditional public housing. Within these 25,000 units, the Plan provides more than 9,000 rehabilitated apartments for seniors in dedicated buildings.

But the ambitions of the Plan's architects do not stop there. The Plan for Transformation seeks socioeconomic reform by integrating public housing and its residents into the larger social, economic and physical fabric of the city of Chicago. In addition to changes to the built environment, the CHA aims to promote change by offering services to help residents with such matters as job training, job placement, substance abuse treatment and education. To help families and youth, the CHA seeks to promote summer programs, day care, and other assistance.

The Chicago Housing Authority’s Plan for Transformation is, in practice, a triple transformation. It entails a transformation of places, a transformation of people, and a transformation of the CHA’s own practices. At the most visible level, the transformation has dramatically altered the landscapes of Chicago public housing, both by elimination of landmark projects of high stigma, and by the creation of new communities and rehabilitated structures. The transformation of people has proceeded in a double sense. Most obviously, it has encompassed transformations in the lives of families and individuals who have been long-term CHA residents. At the same time, however, seen more broadly, the Plan for Transformation has ushered in a shift in those receiving aid from the CHA, a gradual move
away from the concentration of extremely-low-income households clustered in large projects towards a collection of smaller communities and a constellation of other housing opportunities made possible by a greater reliance on portable Housing Choice Vouchers (HCVs). This has been accompanied by a gradual shift towards housing a higher percentage of seniors rather than families (although housing for families will ultimately remain the majority), efforts to attract more public housing eligible households with higher incomes, and policy initiatives to increase the incomes of existing public housing families through work requirements and support services. Aside from the transformations of places and people, a third transformation has centered on the operations of the CHA itself. This, however, has not yet been a focus of research and, therefore, does not constitute a focus of this report. A fuller assessment of the success of the Plan for Transformation would take this dimension more seriously and centrally.

Given that the Plan for Transformation is still a work in progress, it is not always easy to distinguish between matters of process and outcome. The experience of a process, especially one that involves a wrenching shift of domicile, is surely in itself an “outcome” as viewed by residents. On the other hand, coming to firm judgment about an outcome—in the sense of some final resolution of a transition to a new state—is also very much a work-in-progress (or, sometimes, a work-in-regress). The outcome of a newly built community or renovated building cannot be judged solely at a single point in time. Trans-occupancy evaluation remains imperative. Similarly, the socio-economic and psychological impact of relocation out of distressed public housing imparts a trajectory, but does not imply a single fixed time of judgment about how a particular resident has been transformed by the experience. Even though processes and outcomes remain somewhat fluid, it seems nonetheless valuable to separate discussions of research about the CHA’s Plan for Transformation into three categories: a category emphasizing the processes associated with implementation of the Plan, a category focused on the places created or renovated as the result of the Plan, and a focus on what we know so far about the impact of the Plan on the socio-economic lives of residents.
State of the Plan

PHYSICAL REDEVELOPMENT

The Chicago Housing Authority’s Plan for Transformation, launched in 2000, envisioned 25,000 new or rehabilitated units of public housing in the City, to be accomplished over a ten-year period. However, in 2006, the CHA reached an agreement with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to extend Plan’s timeframe by five years, to 2015. According to the Chicago Housing Authority's 2006 Annual Report, a reduction in federal funds, an increase in construction and labor costs, and greater-than-anticipated involvement of public and private partners had combined to set back the Plan for Transformation’s completion date (Edwards and Terpstra, 2007). According to the latest available annual report, as of the end of the 2009, the CHA had redeveloped or rehabilitated 17,812 units of public housing in family, senior, scattered site, and mixed-income developments. Thus, 71.25% of the planned 25,000 units had been completed (Chicago Housing Authority, 2010). In 2008, CHA CEO Lewis Jordan stressed that "the ultimate goals of rebuilding 25,000 public housing units and ending years of isolation remain unchanged" (CHA, FY2008 Annual Report, 2008).

With the extended timeframe, the Metropolitan Planning Council [MPC] notes, "less than one third of the remaining public housing needs to be rebuilt." However, the MPC also observed, in 2008, that the housing market had become "drastically different" than it was at the onset of the Plan for Transformation. The downturn in the housing market presents a significant challenge, "especially given that the outstanding demands are largely within mixed-income developments where strong market activity is critical" (Chicago Housing Authority, 2008b).

ACTIVE HOUSEHOLDS

On October 1, 1999, shortly before the Plan for Transformation commenced in earnest, approximately 25,000 households lived in conventional public housing projects managed by
the CHA. Under the terms of the Plan for Transformation, a total of 26,199 households were granted a Right of Return (ROR), composed of those households living in Chicago public housing at that time, augmented by households entitled to “split” into two units due to the presence of an eligible second household head (an 18-year-old with a child or children), plus additional households granted a Right of Return due to consent decrees and other special circumstances. The vast majority of the ROR populations, just over ninety percent (23,690 households), lived in family developments (15,416 households) or senior developments (8,274 households). The remainder lived in scattered site developments (2,487 households) and mixed-income housing (22 households). As of 2007, (the date of the latest available data about detailed household location outcomes, reported by Georgia Tech economist Thomas D. (Danny) Boston), 13,899 of the original 26,199 households had remained continuously active in CHA housing since the beginning of the Plan for Transformation.\(^1\) By 2007, these continuously active households lived in a significantly different variety of public housing settings than they had in 1999: 4,390 households resided in family developments, 3,307 in senior developments, and 2,543 households in scattered site properties. Of the original 26,199 households from October 1999 who still remained in CHA housing as of 2007, 3,402 now received their subsidy in the form of a housing voucher in Chicago neighborhoods, and an additional twenty households held non-local vouchers. As of 2007, another 1,035 households lived in new mixed-income housing developments constructed as part of the Plan for Transformation (Boston, 2009).

\(^1\) According to Thomas D. (Danny) Boston, "The research team identified the reasons why 10-1-1999 families exited housing between 1999 and 2007. In order of importance they are as follows: deceased (2,073), moved out of the area (1,668), received a Section 8 transfer (1,588 -- although a transfer was received, the individual still exited housing assistance), skipped (1,279), gave no notice of intent to move out (1,146), illness (935), evicted for delinquent rent (860), no termination reason indicated on record (831), evicted for other reasons (568). The reasons that are listed accounted for 89.1 percent of all terminations that occurred among the 10-1-1999 population between 1999 and 2007" (Boston, 2009, p.101). The Boston report referenced here is a draft version, and this version does not reflect the peer review process and subsequent changes that are expected before the report is finalized. The basic CHA statistics reported here are not expected to be altered, however.
CHA’s own reported numbers for 2010 differ significantly from those reported by Boston based on comprehensive administrative data provided to him by the CHA as of 2007. As of March 31, 2010, of the original 26,199 10-1-1999 households, 2,163 families (plus 35 seniors) lived in the new mixed-income housing developments, 3,592 (plus 11 seniors) lived in family or scattered-site public housing, and 4,060 families (plus 231 seniors) received a Housing Choice Voucher. Finally, 2,217 seniors resided in renovated senior properties (CHA, personal communication, May 25, 2010). In sum, then, 12,309 households with a right of return (9,815 families and 2,494 seniors) remained in the CHA system as of March 2010.²

Today the CHA remains the largest owner and facilitator of rental housing in the city of Chicago: the CHA provides homes in both CHA housing and the private rental market to more than 100,000 people, including heads of households and their dependants. As of March 31, 2010, the CHA operates slightly more than 9,000 apartments in buildings designated for seniors and nearly 9,000 units of family housing. In addition to the families served by the Plan for Transformation, the CHA also administers over 31,000 Housing Choice Vouchers that enable other low-income families to rent in the private market (CHA personal communication, 25 May 2010).

² The data reported by Boston (2009) and CHA (2010) do not always match up completely. According to the CHA, “Differences in 10/1/99 population numbers and outcomes between CHA and Boston are due to numerous factors including the combination of data from several different tracking systems which may result in discrepancies. CHA has the internal ability to mitigate and correct these discrepancies in a way that external researchers are not able to, sometimes resulting in differences in analyses. We will continue to work with Boston to clarify any outstanding issues with the data set.” (CHA, personal communication, May 25, 2010).
RENOVATION OF SENIOR HOUSING, FAMILY HOUSING,
AND SCATTERED SITE HOUSING

The Plan for Transformation includes the task of revitalizing the parts of the existing CHA housing stock that it did not raze and rebuild.

Nearly all of the housing rehabilitation designated for seniors is complete (9,178 out of a planned total of 9,382). The number of senior units, in fact, is greater than the number of senior households occupying units in 1999 (when only 8,044 units in senior developments were occupied) (CHA, personal communication, May 25, 2010). Senior housing, in many ways, proved more tractable for the CHA to renovate. Also, the CHA needed to respond to the fact that many residents age in place and consequently have been relocated to senior housing. Despite the large investment in rehabilitating housing for seniors, and the substantial number of units that have resulted from this, the research community has substantially ignored this aspect of the Plan for Transformation.

While much press and scholarly attention has focused on the new mixed-income sites, the CHA has also renovated a sizable number of housing units in both scattered-site properties and family developments. Collectively, these were home in 2008 to more than 14,000 residents (Chicago Housing Authority, 2008b). The overall goal for renovated family properties is 4,978 units (Chicago Housing Authority, personal communication, May 25, 2010). According to the Metropolitan Planning Council (2008), "there was little redevelopment of family properties prior to 2004." However, since then the CHA has completed a number of sites. By March 2010, 3,270 units in family housing had been rehabilitated. By 2015, the goal is to complete an additional 1,708 homes in renovated family developments. Additionally, the CHA completed the rehabilitation of 2,543 scattered-site apartments, single-family homes and/or row houses by the end of 2006. With these homes finished, the CHA thereby accomplished the target number of rehabilitated scattered site housing units stated in the Plan (Chicago Housing Authority, 2008a).
One challenge of the rehabilitation process is ensuring the fit between size of the unit and the needs of households that seek to inhabit this housing. As new units become available for occupancy, the CHA matches residents with units in redeveloped and rehabilitated units. One of the required steps is to provide each household with a Housing Offer Process (HOP) number (CHA Annual Plan, 2003). Every household interested in returning to CHA housing has a Housing Offer Process (HOP) number. This number was generated by independent consultants and is used to determine the order in which households are offered redeveloped and rehabilitated units. As of the end of the fiscal year 2008, there were a significant number of original CHA families on the Housing Offer Process (HOP) list that required four-bedroom units or larger in order to house their family. The CHA plans on conducting a system update, which may reduce the number of families requiring these units. Still, the CHA foresees that a substantial number of families that require four-bedroom units will remain on the HOP list. Therefore, the CHA is looking for an alternate housing strategy to accommodate this need.

While the CHA is rehabilitating some larger units, as well as constructing new units in mixed-income/mixed-finance developments, the supply of larger units will not be sufficient to satisfy the need, both because of the costs associated with building as well as the limited land availability to construct units of that size (Chicago Housing Authority, 2009).

Additionally, the CHA identified an "opportunity" in the depressed real estate market that has yielded an abundance of foreclosed homes. The CHA created a Property Investment Initiative (PII) that will acquire, rehabilitate (if necessary) and lease both foreclosed and for sale properties to public housing families. On January 15, 2009, Chicago Housing Authority commissioners approved the plan to purchase vacant, foreclosed units for large families waiting to return to public housing. The CHA's Property Investment Initiative was allocated $16 million to enable the purchase of about 50 housing units with three or more bedrooms. These units will be added to the Housing Authority’s portfolio and leased to families through typical procedures for filling units, not just to those families with a Right of Return. Fifty percent of the PII units will be leased to community residents and fifty percent will be leased to public housing residents or applicants from the wait list (Chicago Housing Authority, 2009d; CHA, personal communication, May 25, 2010).
MIXED-INCOME HOUSING

The CHA plans to redevelop approximately 10 CHA developments into mixed-income communities across the city (CHA, 2002). The overall goal for CHA units in mixed-income sites is 7,704 (CHA, 2009c). While the Metropolitan Planning Council (2008) notes that, "The Plan’s progress building the new mixed-income communities has been the most visible," according to Edwards and Terpstra (2007), "only two mixed-income developments will be finished before the original 2009 deadline." As of the end of FY 2009, 2,935 units had been completed (CHA, 2010).

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<tr>
<th>Plan for Transformation Unit Completion Summary</th>
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<tr>
<td>Development Category</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Housing Redevelopment --Mixed-Income/Mixed-Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Designated Housing Rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scattered Site Housing Rehabilitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Housing Rehabilitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>To Be Rehabilitated or Redeveloped</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL NUMBER OF PUBLIC HOUSING UNITS</td>
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SECTION 2: DESCRIPTION OF STUDIES REVIEWED

Researchers have employed a variety of methods to investigate the Plan for Transformation, including qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods. The accumulated research output to date varies in terms of both scope and quality: some datasets purport to include the entire CHA population affected by the Plan for Transformation, while others include only a subset of residents found in a single development. The research introduced below has received the most attention in this report, though this report draws from smaller studies as well. The data analysis varies in its quality as well, sometimes enough to call the outcomes reported and conclusions formed into question. A full list of research consulted for this report is provided in the report’s final section.

The research on the Plan for Transformation cited in this report includes published academic research, research reports and white papers by independent research institutes, civic organizations and officially appointed independent monitors. We have also reviewed a good deal of the journalism about the Plan for Transformation, but have not cited it in this report. Although the extensive investigative reporting undertaken by some journalists has also made significant contributions to the public's understanding of how the Plan for Transformation has unfolded, we have not conducted a full review of this journalism to determine which pieces of it includes systematic research that would meet the criteria for this report.

Quantitative work

Three key studies rely primarily on quantitative methods: the Resident Relocation Survey by the University of Chicago’s National Opinion Research Center (NORC), the Public Housing Revitalization and Family Self Sufficiency Study from Thomas D. (Danny) Boston of Georgia Tech, and the HOPE VI Panel Study by the Urban Institute, though none of these relies exclusively on quantitative techniques.

The NORC studies, conducted between 2003-2006, sought to report on the relocation
experiences of current and former leaseholders of the CHA using a series of resident relocation surveys administered since 2002. To date, they have released 5 major baseline surveys and follow-up reports, along with a number of white papers (Rasinski, 2007; Lee, 2007; Ernst, 2007). The Resident Relocation Survey is a longitudinal study and it collects information about the relocation and resettlement experiences of current and former public housing residents in the Phase II (2002) and Phase III (2003) cohort of movers. Ultimately, 666 households participated in the Phase II and Phase III baseline, first and second follow-up, which represented an overall response rate of 86% (NORC, 2007). The survey asked residents about their housing status in relation to their permanent housing choice, the condition of the residents' current housing and the neighborhood, the residents' economic status, health and level of neighborhood involvement, need for and use of social services, and overall satisfaction with relocation.

Important evidence of how residents have fared during the second phase of CHA’s transformation process comes from The Urban Institute’s ongoing HOPE VI Panel Study (Popkin et al., 2002; 2004). The HOPE VI Panel Study sought to focus on the longer-term neighborhood conditions, physical and mental health, location and socioeconomic outcomes for original residents of five HOPE VI sites, selected to represent a range of HOPE VI programs over three waves of data collection at two-year intervals. The HOPE VI Panel Study tracks outcomes for residents from five sites around the country including the Ida B. Wells Homes/Wells Extension/Madden Park Homes in Chicago. The researchers selected the sites because they were considered typical of those that had received HOPE VI grants in 1999 and 2000, but had not yet begun revitalization activities. Designed to answer fundamental questions about how public housing transformation affects the lives of original residents, the study investigates where residents move and how HOPE VI affects their overall well-being. As such, the HOPE VI Panel Study research seeks to address several domains, including: housing quality and mobility, neighborhoods, employment, economic hardship, outcomes for children, and physical and mental health. Finally, because it is a multi-site, longitudinal study, the Panel Study seeks to show not only how CHA residents have fared over time, but also

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3 The other sites include: Shore Park/Shore Terrace in Atlantic City, NJ; Few Gardens in Durham, NC; Easter Hill in Richmond, CA; and East Capitol Dwellings in Washington, D.C.
how the CHA outcomes compare with other housing authorities engaging in relocation and redevelopment initiatives. At the baseline (summer 2001), researchers surveyed a sample of 887 heads of households across the five sites, and conducted in-depth, qualitative interviews with 39 adult-child dyads. The Chicago sample consisted of a random sample of households living in the development. Researchers conducted the second wave of surveys in 2003 (24 months post-baseline), and the third wave in 2005 (48 months post-baseline). The response rate at each round of surveys was 85 percent and the largest source of attrition was mortality—51 of the 887 respondents died or became incapacitated between 2001 and 2005. Researchers note that they were able to locate, if not interview, nearly all sample members (McInnis, Buron and Popkin, 2007). Researchers attempted to confirm all their findings by multivariate analyses that controlled for differences in observed baseline characteristics (e.g., age, gender, site, education, and number of children) that might affect the change in the outcome. Popkin (2010) concludes, "Thus, the differences in outcomes reported here should reflect real differences in outcomes for the two groups rather than a selection effect." The HOPE VI Panel Study has tracked outcomes for 198 residents from Chicago’s Wells/Madden developments (Popkin et al., 2002).

Thomas D. (Danny) Boston, an economist at Georgia Tech, conducted a longitudinal study which aims to track "all" public housing assisted households that were affected by the revitalization and rehabilitation of public housing projects in Chicago. The version of his study cited here is a 2009 draft that had not yet been peer-reviewed. Posing such questions as, "How did revitalization affect the families who formerly lived in public housing projects that were demolished?" and "Did families, who were forced to relocate because of revitalization and rehabilitation, move to better neighborhoods or worse neighborhoods?" and "Did they lose housing assistance?" Boston sought to examine longitudinally every household that received housing assistance from the Chicago Housing Authority between the years 1999 and 2007, an analysis involving thousands of family records. Using two basic measures—neighborhood quality and family self sufficiency, each of which was given an elaborate set of definitional measures, this work attempts to determine outcomes such as changes in housing assistance status, in employment income, in school performance for children, and in neighborhood conditions for the families who were forced to relocate. Boston’s team also
examined crime patterns in the neighborhoods where former public housing residents relocated. When the study began in 1999, the database included 26,199 households: 17,925 families and 8,274 seniors. In 2007, this number was 13,889: 10,592 families and 3,307 seniors.

**Qualitative Studies**

Another set of important studies has relied more on qualitative measures. A prominent series of studies headed by Sudhir Venkatesh at Columbia University's Center for Urban Research and Policy followed families who relocated from Chicago public housing authority units in 2003 (Venkatesh, 2002; Venkatesh and Celimni, 2004). Using a mixture of quantitative analysis and qualitative techniques such as ethnography and resident interviews, the research sought to uncover the long-term social outcomes for households making the transition from CHA family housing to other forms of housing—including CHA-controlled subsidized programs as well as private market residences. The research also sought to identify the challenges for families as they integrate into new communities. Specifically, the research team included both University researchers and public housing tenants trained in social science research. According to the author, "The use of tenants as fieldworkers combined with the Principal Investigator’s ten-year experience studying Chicago public housing provided access into the relocation process unavailable to other researchers and advocates." The study combines this observation of on-site behavior—by property managers, squatters and street gang members—with system-wide data on all families relocating from CHA developments in 2003. The report includes a description of the social and geographic outcomes of all CHA families leaving public housing in 2003 "and analyzes the process of relocation in order to determine the factors affecting family outcomes." In addition, the study reviews data tracking families from one public housing development, the Robert Taylor Homes, with the goal of assessing their challenges in integrating into new homes and new communities.

Research headed by Mark Joseph, currently at Case Western University and Robert Chaskin from the University of Chicago’s School of Social Service Administration entailed a three-year study, commencing in 2007, of four mixed-income communities created as part of
the Plan for Transformation: Oakwood Shores, Park Boulevard, Westhaven Park and Jazz on the Boulevard. Their research focuses on community building strategies and progress, and resident experiences and outcomes. The study involves observations of meetings and social interaction among residents at each of the new developments as well as in-depth interviews with residents, developers, and other community stakeholders at the sites. In addition, researchers collected administrative data and other documentation.

The report produced by the CHA’s first independent monitor, hired by the CHA but whose role is prescribed by the Residents Relocation Rights Contract, also provided in-depth qualitative analysis that informs this report. In 2002, Independent Monitor Thomas Sullivan and his research team reviewed documents, conducted over 150 interviews with stakeholders, resident advocates, and service providers and attended resident meetings to assess the relocation process. The team sought to determine the efforts by the CHA to minimize hardship for relocatees and to assess the CHA's success in attaining its goals and remaining compliant with the Relocation Rights Contract. Their research focused specifically on Phase II, but commented on processes that occurred in Phase I as well activities planned for Phase III.

Both quantitatively- and qualitatively-oriented researchers have focused their attention on three primary areas: the experience of relocation during the implementation of the Plan for Transformation, the Plan’s outcomes for residents, and the Plan’s outcomes for housing and neighborhood quality. These questions of process, people, and place are addressed, successively, in the three sections that follow.
SECTION 3: CONSENSUS FINDINGS, UNRESOLVED DEBATES, AND NEW RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

The assessment of the literature on the Plan for Transformation suggests that some research questions have been answered definitively. The answers to many other questions remain actively debated. Moreover, there are many questions that have not yet been effectively asked and pursued by the research community. This section categorizes the status of such research questions. In the first category are the dominant, most consistent findings, both positive and negative, about the Plan for Transformation. The second category includes those issues that researchers have attempted to address, but remain inconclusive because the findings among studies are inconsistent or the research itself does not support the conclusions drawn. The third category includes issues that researchers have yet to address.

The major research domains outlined in this report—Processes, People, and Places—are described in more detail in Sections 4, 5 and 6 and provide the evidentiary basis for the assessments and categorizations made in Section 3. This initial section introduces that research, divided into areas of consensus, areas of ongoing debate that need follow-on study, and untapped areas of importance that require new research dimensions--categorized below as Consensus, Debate, and New Directions. Although we have not proposed specific priorities for follow-on research and new research directions, it is hoped that this section of the Report will be the first step in setting such an agenda.

1. PROCESSES

Processes: Areas of Research Consensus

How well are resident counseling services associated with the Plan for Transformation serving residents?

 Resident counseling services have improved since the beginning of the Plan for Transformation. Popkin (2010), Sullivan (2003), Parkes et al. (2009) and BPI (2009) have
reviewed recent counseling activities and found that these are increasingly functional and that the services offered to residents today are significantly better than those available to residents in "the early years." While the counseling system was quite rudimentary and inadequate when the Plan For Transformation began, pressure from advocacy groups, findings from research efforts and ongoing efforts by the CHA have yielded impressive improvements. These include better incentives for opportunity moves. Researchers agree that this reorganized counseling system increases the likelihood that residents will locate to units in low-poverty neighborhoods. Additionally, the CHA now offers improved programs to help residents prepare for and secure employment (Parkes et al., 2009; BPI, 2009). Finally, researchers have concluded that severely disadvantaged residents need more intensive services. The CHA has initiated a separate counseling initiative for these hard-to-house clients that, thus far, has served residents better than the previous counseling system (Popkin, 2010).

Processes: Areas of Ongoing Debate Among Researchers

How many 10-1-1999 residents will benefit from moves into mixed-income developments?

Some scholars question ultimately just how many CHA leaseholders will live in mixed-income housing. The Plan was presented to the public as an initiative that involves, "demolishing the old projects and replacing them with fewer units that are higher quality and serve a wider mix of income levels." Given this goal, some scholars question the number of original residents who will live in mixed-income developments, and, more generally, question the relative paucity of hard units serving those with extremely low incomes. According to Boston, just 1,035 of the 10-1-1999 households lived in the 2,472 subsidized units in the CHA’s new mixed-income housing developments as of 2007. While construction of mixed-income housing is only about one-third complete, the low return rate as calculated by Boston suggests that few of the 10-1-1999 residents will ultimately live in mixed-income developments, implying that most of those who do gain places in the ‘public housing eligible’ portion of the new mixed-income communities will not be 10-1-1999 families with a Right of Return. However, 2010 data from the CHA indicates that 2,198 households (including 35
seniors) eligible for a right of return currently occupy a unit in a mixed income development, out of a total 2,977 completed units (CHA, personal communication, May 25, 2010). Thus, given the discrepancy between Boston's analysis of CHA data and the data supplied by the CHA directly for this report, it remains an open question how many original residents have benefitted from mixed-income redevelopment. According to Joseph (2008), developers are having difficulty finding 10-1-1999 residents to move into the available units in mixed-income developments, sometimes because such residents elected to become permanent voucher holders or sometimes because the tenant selection criteria in the new mixed-income developments is a major deterrent, "even to those who are currently eligible." Alexander (2009) adds that the implementation of the mixed-income housing initiative "may preclude large numbers of original public housing residents from returning to the new developments."

It is worth reiterating that the Plan intended that only 7,697 of the 25,000 public housing units planned for revitalization would be located in mixed-income housing developments. That relatively few 10-1-1999 residents will end up in the new mixed-income communities is therefore not a failure of the plan; it is, rather, a premise of the Plan. Still, it remains an open question how many 10-1-1999 residents will ultimately occupy those units.4

How should the CHA balance the goal of finding affordable housing with the goal of reducing racial segregation?

Research on the Plan for Transformation suggests not a declining significance of race (Wilson, 1978), but rather a changing one. Many of the evaluations of outcomes for residents assess the racial concentration of residents' new neighborhoods, and there appears to be little

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4 CHA figures for the return of public housing residents to mixed-income developments are within the range of HOPE VI returns nationwide. As of September 30, 2008, HUD figures showed that 24 percent of “the total households relocated” had returned to HOPE VI sites, though this figure may overstate the return rate since it doesn’t take account of those households lost to the public housing system before they could be temporarily relocated (Cisneros and Engdahl 2009, 302). Return rates vary significantly. The Urban Institute's HOPE VI Panel Study that has followed five developments over time in different cities that received HOPE VI grants in 2000, found that only an average of 5 percent of households had returned as of 2005 (with additional returnees expected in subsequent years). At another extreme, however, some housing authorities have brought back up to 75 percent of former public housing residents, although those sites tended to be among the few where the housing was merely rehabilitated, rather than demolished and rebuilt for a mixed-income constituency (Popkin and Cunningham, 2009, 194-195).
change in the racial concentration of movers' destination neighborhoods. The assessment of racial concentration originates in part from the Gautreaux cases, which Law professor Lisa Alexander (2009) called the "Brown v. Board of Education of public housing reform." The landmark cases made the construction of public housing units in racially segregated areas illegal and rendered the racial diversity of public housing tenants' neighborhoods a salient variable. Yet scholars and practitioners debate the relevance today of restricting the construction of public housing (or voucher use) in predominately black areas (Boston, Pattillo). The situation has been made even more complex by the growth of Chicago’s Latino population since the Gautreaux cases were first litigated, all part of a larger racial and ethnic diversification that calls into question the relevance of basing policy on the assumption of a black-white political demographic. Moreover, Pattillo (2007) underscores growing class diversity within what is often represented as the monolithic “Black community.” She identifies various interest group struggles among black public housing residents, middle- and working-class black homeowners, black city officials, black developers, and black community organizations, as well as white city politicians. Pattillo uncovers what occurs when these forces intersect in neighborhoods that house both black public housing residents and black middle class residents. In some ways their interests coalesce and in other ways their interests diverge. Consequently, the debate remains unresolved about how the location of public housing in black neighborhoods affects poor black residents. Court action reflects the changing class dynamics in African American neighborhoods. A 1981 federal court order in the HUD portion of the Gautreaux case held that public housing in Chicago could be built in so called “revitalizing areas” (Polikoff 2006, 240). Revitalizing areas contain a substantial minority population but are undergoing sufficient redevelopment or revitalization to indicate that the areas will become more economically integrated in a relatively short time period. The introduction of the standard of revitalizing areas, then, reflects an ongoing ambiguity about the import of low-income minority households living in racial minority-dominated neighborhoods.
Has the Plan for Transformation caused more residents to lose their housing assistance sooner than without the Plan?

To date, half of the original 10-1-1999 residents are no longer active tenants of CHA housing and we know little about how that other half now lives (except in cases where we know that they are by now deceased). Thus, if one uses Boston's figures, the long-term outcomes for nearly 8,000 former CHA households, all of whom were CHA residents when the Plan for Transformation began, remain unknown. And, perhaps more importantly, it is still unclear if the Plan for Transformation caused residents to lose their housing assistance sooner than would have occurred without this Plan. Boston attempts to adjudicate this matter by determining the expected attrition rate. As Boston (2009) notes, "We will find that the percentage of families who exit housing assistance is stable from year to year. They exit for the following reasons: some families fall behind in rent and therefore are evicted; some heads of households become seriously ill and are not longer capable of living unassisted; some die; some are evicted for various lease violations; some secure housing in the private sector; some are evicted for engaging in criminal activity; some move away from the Chicago area. …[T]he correct question therefore becomes, by how much has revitalization or rehabilitation increased the normal rate of attrition” (p.100). Boston then seeks to calculate the expected rate of attrition using CHA historical data. This is somewhat problematic, given that he calculates the ‘normal’ or ‘baseline’ attrition rate for the seven years prior to the start of the Plan for Transformation (October 1992 to October 1999). As documented by Jacob and others, a significant amount of demolition of CHA housing occurred in the 1990s, so these demolitions could well have skewed the ‘normal’ rate of attrition upward, thereby raising questions about

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5 This is the sum of 10-1-1999 residents who, as of 2007, had moved out of the area (1,668), received a Section 8 transfer (1,588 – although a transfer was received, the individual still exited housing assistance), skipped (1,279), gave no notice of intent to move out (1,146), were evicted for delinquent rent (860), had no termination reason indicated on their record (831), or were evicted for other reasons (568). This number totals 7,940 and does not include those residents who died (Boston, 2009). However, preliminary figures supplied directly from the CHA to the authors of this report in December 2009 suggest that far fewer 10-1-1999 households have lost their right of return—only 4,378. Therefore, the CHA and Boston figures remain unreconciled at this time.
what constitutes a reasonable baseline rate. More seriously, even using this baseline to compare the pre-2000 attrition rate to that of the first seven years of the Plan for Transformation, Boston found that attrition rates during the Plan for Transformation exceeded the expected rate of attrition. He reports that in addition to the expected rate of attrition of 6.6% (p.80) "attrition was higher in the years following the plan by 2.5 percentage points yearly" (p.100). This additional attrition, Boston notes, can be considered an effect of the Plan for Transformation. Yet Boston’s Draft report does not discuss this finding further, and thereby appears to dismiss its significance. 2.5% is indeed a small number, but this is an annual difference that accumulates across many years. From 2000 to the end of Boston’s data set in 2007, there have been seven full years of accumulated excess attrition. This suggests that, cumulatively, about 17.5% of CHA 10-1-1999 households with a Right of Return may have lost their housing assistance due to the Plan for Transformation; this is the number beyond the ‘expected’ rate of attrition. It remains important for researchers and policymakers to know more about why these additional households left. There are CHA administrative codes that ostensibly provide a reason why most households had their assistance terminated or chose to depart, but these data have not yet been systematically analyzed by independent researchers (see Footnote 1). How many left voluntarily and how many left for other reasons? If most of the excess attrition from CHA housing during 2000-2007 was involuntary (and not due primarily to death or serious illness), is the non inclusion of that segment of the cohort data sufficiently significant to skew Boston’s analysis of the outcomes for the overall CHA population? That is, will omitting 17.5 percent of the data from the analysis—households that presumably fared worse than most-- cause the findings to overstate the overall improvement for CHA residents resulting from the Plan for Transformation?

Related to this, researchers should study whether the Plan for Transformation has increased homelessness in Chicago. Moreover, if it has, it will be important to know whether this is this because legitimate CHA tenants have lost housing assistance or because illegal tenants (those not on the CHA lease) have been displaced.
How have 10-1-1999 CHA residents with a Right of Return experienced the housing choice process?

The research to date reveals that the Plan for Transformation’s net impact on the original 10-1-1999 leaseholders may not be quite as significant as the architects of the Plan intended. In part this is due simply to the length of time that it has taken to implement the Plan. As of 2007, just over half of the 10-1-1999 residents were still active CHA households and thus able to benefit from the potential positive changes the Plan sought to make in their lives. To date, there are also very few families who have moved into mixed-income developments, and researchers have documented a decreasing likelihood that 10-1-1999 residents will choose to (or be able to) exercise their Right of Return to move into mixed-income developments. While scholars note that the prevailing assumption of the Plan for Transformation was that most non-senior residents would be able to move out of public housing and into either mixed-income housing or the private market using vouchers, for most 10-1-1999 residents this has not been the case. Yet, as noted earlier, Boston’s analysis of CHA administrative data shows that, as of 2007, there were just over 3,400 voucher holders, while 3,345 households remained in public housing (excluding senior housing), suggesting that for the many of the 10-1-1999 households, the benefits from living in the private market have been inaccessible.

In any case, over the medium and long-term, the benefits derived from the Plan for Transformation will increasingly benefit future residents, rather than the 10-1-1999 residents that had suffered through the worst conditions. This is to be expected from a long-term plan premised on a transformation of Chicago’s entire public housing system. In the short-term, though, there is an issue of which 10-1-1999 families are able to pass the selection criteria to get vouchers. The increasingly stringent criteria for voucher use brings into question just how much "choice" residents truly have in availing themselves of the housing choice voucher option. Do relocated residents really feel that they had a choice about type of housing? What constrains their choices?
What are CHA residents' perspectives on the Plan for Transformation?

Many researchers have questioned whether the CHA residents affected by the Plan for Transformation actually support it, and this has certainly been a popular question for Chicago journalists. According to Pattillo (2007), the vision for mixed-income redevelopment was developed in private meetings in Chicago between largely private institutional actors such as developers, university representatives, financial intermediaries, and lawyers. Public housing residents were all but excluded from these private meetings. While the CHA and other agencies held some formal meetings, many of the most important decisions that determined which public housing residents could ultimately return to the new developments were made in private settings and these decisions were not subject to public review. "The evolution and implementation of the mixed-income policy reveals that it did not emerge from the 'bottom up.' Mixed-income housing was not necessarily a solution for the public housing problems voiced by public housing residents. In fact, the Central Advisory Council (CAC), a representative body made up of representatives from each public housing development was not systematically included in the initial goal setting and development of the Plan. Rather, the CAC was only asked to vote to approve the Plan after it was fully developed by the CHA…Mixed-income in Chicago, thus, contributes to the gentrification of public housing neighborhoods and to the displacement of, rather than the empowerment of many former residents" (160).

What is the proper baseline from which to measure 'transformation'?

Another issue raised by the literature is whether the year 1999 is really the appropriate date to start tracking the outcomes for CHA residents. In some ways it is, since it marks the return of CHA control to Mayor Richard M. Daley after a period of federal stewardship that began in 1995. Starting in 1999, the mayor and CHA leaders “immediately began to project an image of reform” (Gebhardt, 2009). That said, the particular moment of 10-1-1999 is no more or less than the legally agreed upon date from which residents could assert a “Right of Return.” It does not coincide with the beginning of transformation efforts at the CHA, given how much
demolition and redevelopment activity had already occurred. While the Plan for Transformation officially became policy in 2000, many scholars (Gebhardt, Pattillo, Hunt) have traced the CHA efforts to reform public housing back at least to the early 1990s. The CHA received its first HOPE VI grant in 1994 and some of the most prominent developments considered part of the Plan for Transformation -- Cabrini-Green, the ABLA development, the Robert Taylor Homes and the Henry Horner Homes all received redevelopment grants prior to 1996. Just how much redevelopment activity took place prior to the official declaration of policy? According to Jacob (2004), 51 buildings and 6,629 units were demolished from 1991-1998, while 56 buildings and 7,341 units were demolished from 1999-2007. Looking at these data, almost as many public housing units were torn down in the decade prior to the declaration of the Plan for Transformation as in the first decade of the Plan. Thus, it appears that 1999-2000 is not the beginning of “transformation” but, rather, a major mid-course statement of policy, a significant transfer of responsibility for the CHA back to the mayor, a declaration of will, and an identification of funding. It remains worth asking: How many people were affected by the ‘pre-Transformation transformation’ resulting from these pre-Transformation demolitions and how have they fared?

*Processes: New Directions for Research*

**How will the Plan for Transformation change the self-identity of the CHA?**

The CHA has also transformed its role in public housing provision from an owner to an incentive creator. As Smith (2006) explains, "[a]s laid out in the original 'Plan for Transformation,' the CHA no longer positions itself as a housing provider, but rather now is a ‘facilitator’ of housing." Prior to creation of the Plan, the CHA owned and managed over 20 large multi-family public housing developments and an even larger number of senior properties in inner-city neighborhoods. Now the CHA only owns the land under the new mixed-income developments; it does not own the buildings or other improvements on the land. The new mixed-income developments are owned by private developers who lease the land under the developments from the CHA under a 99-year ground lease for one dollar per
year. Despite the reduction in family units under ownership and management, as noted earlier, the CHA has increased its holdings for seniors. What do these shifts in mission and clientele mean in terms of a change in the identity of the housing authority?

A larger comparative project between different housing authorities is also in order: Which housing authorities have taken over what responsibilities and to what effect? What are the core responsibilities that matter to the self-identity of the authority and how does that relate to performance?

How has the Plan for Transformation changed the public perception of public housing?

How can researchers measure the change in public perception of public housing and its residents? How has the role of public housing in Chicago communities been transformed? Has it become more integrated into the community?

2. PEOPLE

People: Areas of Research Consensus

How have residents fared when they moved into the private housing market with vouchers?

Researchers generally conclude that residents who have moved into the private market using HCVs have shown a variety of improvements. For those residents who remain clients of the CHA and have moved into the private housing market using vouchers, moving out of distressed public housing into a place that is safer and lower poverty has had a positive impact on residents' quality of life. Both the NORC studies and the Urban Institute studies confirm that there have been improvements in movers' mental health. These studies also show that neighborhoods are also safer than their former public housing neighborhoods. Finally, studies concur that most movers enjoy better quality of housing. Reports from voucher holders
indicate that they feel safer and live in safer areas (Popkin, 2010; NORC, 2007). Importantly, contrary to popular lore, there appears to be little crime impact from the influx of public housing residents into the private housing market (Boston, 2009; Hartley, 2008).

**How have residents fared who have remained in traditional CHA public housing?**

The research suggests that thus far there have been few benefits for non-movers: those households who have remained in CHA conventional public housing, especially that which has not yet been rehabilitated. While research shows dramatic improvement to residents' mental health when they use vouchers to move to the private market, residents who remain in family public housing show elevated levels of stress. The cause of this remains unknown: it may be caused by the hyper concentration of disadvantaged households left behind in public housing units. It may also be a reflection of the trend for more high functioning households to move into the private market.

**People: Areas of Ongoing Debate Among Researchers**

**Do those who move with vouchers continue to show improvements over time after moving into the private market?**

Although there is some research consensus about the benefits of moving away from conventional public housing developments with the assistance of a Housing Choice Voucher, most of these studies only assess movers a year or two after they move from public housing, so longer-term outcomes remain unknown, especially in cases where voucher-holders move multiple times.

Researchers have speculated that movers will become more socially integrated into their new neighborhoods and that this can be beneficial, as residents make gains from productive social ties. But other researchers speculate that increased social integration could be detrimental, especially for youth, for whom early social isolation may be protective.
What have the outcomes been for CHA youth?

Adults and, especially, adult heads of households, have received the bulk of the scholarly attention when assessing the impacts of the Plan for Transformation. Consequently we know less about how the Plan has affected youth. The existing research on children and youth is limited. The Panel Study includes youth and offers some intriguing findings about differences in behavior between movers and non-movers and between boys and girls, but the sample size is small. The Chapin Hall Center for Children at the University of Chicago has conducted research comparing educational outcomes for children who have remained in CHA housing to those who have relocated from it, but this has remained unpublished. Additionally, the NORC Residential Satisfaction Survey includes questions about youth, but the analysis of the data is limited and the findings are entirely quantitative. NORC researchers expect to conduct further analysis of their data on youth outcomes.

Meanwhile, as the Metropolitan Planning Commission highlights, current service strategies focus on job readiness and self-sufficiency for adults, yet more than 11,000 of CHA residents are age 20 and younger (Chicago Housing Authority, 2008b).

Will outcomes for early movers differ from outcomes experienced by later cohorts?

Research suggests that there are differences between the experiences of early (2000-2003) and later (2003-2008) movers. Researchers note that the counseling systems both for relocation and employment have improved dramatically since the early years, suggesting that housing and employment outcomes for later movers may be better than for early movers. Yet other research documents how the housing conditions have worsened over time for non-movers still awaiting relocation. Moreover, this group is the most disadvantaged: Final movers will be the hardest to place. The tenants in traditional public housing now are the most troubled, the oldest and in the poorest health (Popkin, 2010). Thus, a number of questions remain: First, there are no systematic data comparing outcomes for earlier and later movers, nor a clear sense of how many new movers there are each year. Is there some kind of cohort effect for the
10-1-1999 households? How do different counseling initiatives impact the assessment of outcomes? Can results found for earlier phase movers be expected for later phase movers? Boston attempted to address this issue by creating comparison groups. However, the groups are not defined by the timing of relocation but rather grouped by the kind of redevelopment regime each group experienced: Group 1, for example, contained residents whose developments had undergone substantial mixed-income revitalization by 2007. Group 2 included residents whose buildings were scheduled for mixed-income redevelopment but where activities had not yet begun. These cohorts, therefore, do not explicitly capture residents' relocation dates. The Boston draft study stops short of exploiting the longitudinal panel nature of the data at the individual level; perhaps this is not yet a lost opportunity and can still be mined for additional insights. Another way to consider dividing cohorts for useful research comparisons might be by needs: One group of residents have few needs despite having lived in public housing for some time. Many have a high school degree and have been mostly been working. When these residents get a voucher, they do fine and over time are similar to others in voucher program. A second group of residents, however, is needier. The group is comprised of working age heads of household who are vulnerable. Many have kids at home but the have mental health problems, complicated family problems, substance abuse problems. A third group of residents could be composed of seniors and other residents who have aged in place. They obviously need some services but their needs are probably oriented more towards those of elderly people. Does transformation create winners and losers among these three groups, helping the first group who are the least disadvantaged but offering little for those in the second group who are 'hard to house'? " In other words, is there a pattern of "exponential gain" (Lewis and Singa, 2004) whereby the Plan for Transformation benefits the most advantaged, capable and stable households, pulling them out of poverty, while conversely, the most disadvantaged families fail to benefit, or worse, are penalized by the policy? What percentage of the total 10-1-1999 population has proved to be hard to house? What have their outcomes been like over time? Did the biggest gains go to the smallest sub-cohort?
Do residents who leave public housing experience gains in employment?

The CHA has identified self-sufficiency and increases in employment and income levels as a prime goal for the Plan for Transformation. Numerous debates about outcomes remain unresolved. There are contradictory reported findings regarding employment gains, resident health, and outcomes for movers vs. non-movers. Reported research findings on employment outcomes also vary. Buron (2004) found little or no improvement in employment rates for voucher holders. Barriers to employment include residents' poor physical and mental health status and low levels of education, as well as the poor status of the economy (Popkin and Theodos, 2008). Unpublished research from the Chapin Hall Center for Children at the University of Chicago found that, for those households reporting earnings from employment during 2000, 2001, and 2002, the median incomes of households and household heads were higher for CHA residents than for those that had relocated away from CHA properties. However, both Boston (2009) and a joint study by the Chicago Housing Authority, The Partnership for New Communities and The Mayor's Office of Workforce Development (2006) found increases in employment income for those who left traditional public housing. While Boston's findings passed his tests for statistical significance, the MPC (2006) drew a more cautious conclusion from the Chicago Housing Authority's joint study, citing a number of alternative explanations that would minimize the impact of the increase in employment income for movers.

There is a clear disconnect in the research between Danny Boston's findings in his draft report that show gains, and most other work --in Chicago and nationally--that has not found employment gains from voucher use. Further research needs to take place on this issue. A key question may be, if gains to employment status and income do take place, how many years does it take for positive results to appear? And, in Chicago, what has been the effect of the CHA's new system-wide work requirement?
Is selection bias interfering with comparisons between those who exit conventional public housing and those who do not?

Because of varied outcomes, researchers have raised many questions about whether there are systematic differences between movers and non-movers. Boston attempted to use multivariate analysis to test for selection bias and his draft report found none, but qualitative findings reported by other scholars challenge this conclusion. While quantitative analysis attempts to address this by controlling for many factors, qualitative data all but documents a selection bias in action. For example, Popkin details how non-movers in the Wells and Dearborn sample were the lowest functioning households. They had failed to qualify for vouchers or mixed-income housing, and had been hard to engage in the relocation process. Thus, the comparison between movers and non-movers is one between a mover group that had met performance standards and a non-mover group that had not. The households remaining in public housing were there because they had not been selected for other options. And as Thompson (2006) notes, “self-sufficiency ultimately means that the resident has no assistance, including rental subsidies. Under the Plan for Transformation, successful transitions into the private market seem to require something very close to self-sufficiency. Residents need to be able to thrive in the rental market with little assistance other than a voucher.” Thus, the voucher program may not offer enough support to the hard-to-house residents who require additional social services to aid them with mental health, employment and family challenges. Moreover, because of high standards for lease compliant housing, and because few of the most disadvantaged residents are accepted for entry, a greater advantage should be expected for those who do get accepted. Problems of selection bias plague conclusion about the differences between outcomes for movers and non-movers as well.

Are residents with HCVs moving into mixed-income (or opportunity) neighborhoods?

The housing choice voucher (HCV) program aims to move residents into mixed-income neighborhoods as part of an overall strategy to deconcentrate poverty. However, the research shows that residents have had limited success moving into units in low-poverty opportunity
neighborhoods. While maps created by Boston for his draft report (2009) claim to show that, increasingly, the HCV movers are moving to ‘better’ neighborhoods, the maps also appear to reveal that few of these moves (even the recent ones) have been to the top “Community Attribute Index” quintiles. However, the data presentation and analysis in Boston’s draft report do not allow readers to make these calculations with sufficient detail, since early version of the report does not provide tabular data about how many HCV holders have moved into neighborhoods with particular poverty characteristics, and does not then provide these tables over time so that the trend can be assessed for statistical significance. Since the CHA has redoubled its efforts to move residents into opportunity neighborhoods, the question of mixed-income residency also remains an urgent matter to resolve. Yet there is no standard definition for a "mixed-income neighborhood," making it difficult to assess whether the HCV moves are to “mixed-income neighborhoods” and whether options such as scattered site housing qualify. Can a neighborhood be considered “mixed-income” if it is also still 40% poor (and, therefore, still designated as “high poverty”), for instance? Once a standard for what counts as a desirable form of mixed-income neighborhood is reached, it may finally be possible to answer the question: How many CHA clients will live in neighborhoods that qualify as mixed-income?

People: New Directions for Research

What more needs to be known about the outcomes for CHA youth?

Many questions remain about CHA youth, especially around youth outcomes in mixed-income developments, where research is especially scant. There needs to be more qualitative and quantitative work on youth who have moved compared with those who have remained in traditional CHA public housing. Research could focus on a variety of matters: school issues, peer effects, youth health and well-being, adjustment to new neighborhoods, youth social networks, youth experiences in mixed-income developments, and aspirations for the future. For example, do the Panel Study findings about youth hold for larger samples and over time? What are the youth outcomes and experiences in the mixed-income developments? Outcomes
for youth on the other end of the housing extreme need to be studied as well. Youth who live in hard to-house families are especially vulnerable and their outcomes should be carefully tracked. How do youth outcomes compare across settings?

**What have the outcomes been for seniors?**

There appears to be almost no research on the senior population, a fact made even more surprising because a greater number of post transformation CHA holdings are in senior developments. According to the CHA (2002), in the inventory of Chicago Public Housing units, 7,063 of the senior units were occupied. Yet the Plan for Transformation called for 9,382 senior units to be developed. This is the only category of housing where the CHA planned to increase the number of units (by restoring the stock to full occupancy). Perhaps some of this increase reflects the number of residents who have aged in place, or perhaps this increase reflects a desire to deal with a less complicated constituency and/or set of buildings. The question of why the CHA chose to increase the number and percentage of housing units for seniors remains undiscussed in the research literature. Under the current Plan for Transformation, 37.5% or 9,382 of the 25,000 planned public housing units will be senior housing (and these will house many more seniors than were offered a Right of Return). This is the single largest category of CHA properties under the Plan, so it is particularly surprising not to be a setting for research. What impact has the Plan had on seniors? For example, do they show the same improvements in mental health measures that the working age adult population has when moving with vouchers or to mixed-income communities? Or do they fare less well, more like younger households who have moved into other CHA properties? How has the Plan affected the networks of seniors, especially those offering social support? What has the impact of relocation been on this population? What kinds of support have been most helpful to assisting this vulnerable population? How have seniors fared in different settings: In senior-only developments? In mixed-income communities? In other communities where they are raising grandchildren (grandfamilies)?
How have residents fared in rehabilitated public housing?

The prospects for CHA residents moving to rehabilitated family public housing remain uncertain. Additionally, researchers find that because the lease compliance rules are more strict now than they were in the early years, the remaining population has become "doubly disadvantaged": they were unable to move when standards were less demanding and they now face even higher barriers. Does this create the risk that a high concentration of disadvantaged households will remain in public housing? Aside from quantitative measures about some socioeconomic variables describing families in conventional public housing, however, there is still little qualitative data about life in rehabbed family and senior developments. Since, taken together, these communities constitute a significant majority of the total number of units delivered by the Plan for Transformation, additional research about the outcomes for residents in these places should be undertaken.

Will the voucher holders continue to accumulate gains compared to those living in renovated family properties? Is it possible that renovation of family public housing could also instill some of the gains typical of more fully revitalized developments? In their study of the effects of welfare reform on Chicago families receiving TANF from 1999-2002 (just as the Plan began), Lewis and Sinha (2004) found "strong limits on income growth" (p. 158) and hypothesized that early income gains observed for participants would decline in subsequent years. Beyond questions about income, other questions about long-term outcomes remain. Will residents remain lease compliant? Will access to institutional support affect residents' employment? Which services do residents actually use and which ones seem to have the greatest impact? Are there models of supportive housing that work well for CHA residents?

How can research findings about outcomes be generalized to the entire public housing population?

In general, much of the data compiled and analyzed by researchers captures only a small segment of the population affected by the Plan for Transformation and does so only during a
limited time period. For example, this report frequently cites the Urban Institute’s HOPE VI Panel Study. While the study was carefully conducted and has a high response rate, the analytical impact of its conclusions is limited by the small number of people in the sample. Moreover, the respondents come from a single, possibly anomalous, cluster of sites. Similarly, NORC’s Resident Relocation Survey had a high response rate but followed only about 660 Phase II and Phase III residents from 2002 to 2006. Thus, conclusions from this study are also limited by the small sample size and limited time span. The analysis in NORC reports uses only basic statistics, though the researchers have made the dataset publicly available for further statistical analysis. Only Boston (2009) claims to have data on all CHA households from the beginning of the Plan until close to the present (2007). However, there are several problems with this claim; most obviously, though Boston has been able to track all active residents (or, more precisely, all active household heads), with each passing year, more residents became inactive.

What happened to those who exited CHA housing?

While much of the most needed research should look forward, there should also be further study about those who were granted a Right of Return in 1999, but left the CHA system before exercising this right. Many questions remain about what has happened to the entire population of the original 26,199 households. According to Popkin, Cunningham and Burt (2005), "a primary goal of the HOPE VI program – and public housing transformation more broadly – is to ensure an improved living environment for all original residents" (p. 5). While Boston's research claims to track "all" the residents, in reality, it can only track the residents who remained active and accessible through the CHA's administrative data. And, moreover, "residents" as a term is treated by Boston as synonymous with household heads or with adults, so that is it less possible to trace the experiences of minors.
Is the confluence of race, class and gender dynamics fully appreciated?

Many quantitatively oriented research reports fail to take sufficient account of the dominant demographic characteristics of the Chicago public housing population: black single mothers. Chicago's public housing population is overwhelmingly black, female, and, obviously, poor. With the exceptions of Pattillo's ethnography and the work of Feldman and Stall (2004), there is little documentation or even acknowledgment of how this population which has been historically marginalized, both socially and politically, fares in negotiations with mainstream stakeholders. As Alexander notes, "Since a majority of public housing households are headed by single black women, gender dynamics are also an undeniable part of the transformation of public housing communities. Thus, it is even more unclear than ever that there is a unified black presence in the inner city" (Alexander, 2009). While resident participation has often been documented among low-income residents, the converging dynamics of class, race and gender in the context of contested public housing redevelopment needs further exploration. How do negotiations proceed between the traditionally powerful developers and homeowners and the traditionally powerless public housing residents?

3. PLACES

Places: Areas of Research Consensus

Has the influx of voucher holders into Chicago neighborhoods had a negative impact on crime levels?

Neither Boston (2009) nor Hartley (2008) found an increase in crime in neighborhoods where Chicago public housing residents had relocated using Housing Choice Vouchers. Indeed, the demographic impact of this group of HCV holders (i.e., those HCV holders whose vouchers come as a result of moving away from public housing during the Plan for Transformation) in communities has been small, and the CHA reports that these HCV relocatees make up no more than 3% in any community. However, if all HCV holders are considered (both the ones
used by 10-1-1999 households and the 31,000 vouchers used by others), voucher holders comprise as much as 10-15% of the total population in some Chicago communities (CHA, personal communication, May 25, 2010).

How well are existing public housing developments faring?

There is much evidence that the conditions in the already distressed public housing developments have deteriorated further since implementation of the Plan for Transformation has begun. High vacancy rates and an increased concentration of hard-to-house households have left the developments with an increasingly isolated and disadvantaged population.

Do the neighborhoods where CHA leaseholders live offer higher quality schools than those available prior to the Plan for Transformation?

Thus far, researchers have found little evidence of improvements in the schools serving children living in mixed-income developments. Jacob (2003) found that moving due to the demolition of public housing buildings had no impact on the academic achievement of younger children on a variety of outcome measures, including test scores, grades and retention. He further found movers were attending schools identical to those of a control group of students and, even when students did move to substantially better neighborhoods, they did not end up in significantly better schools. Moreover, Boston’s draft report (2009) yielded negative findings about the quality of the elementary schools serving both the mixed-income neighborhoods and the neighborhoods accessed through use of vouchers. He found that, compared to the original public housing neighborhoods--both of these types of neighborhoods surprisingly had lower quality elementary schools. Looking forward, even if elementary schools improve near the redeveloped mixed-income communities, Pattillo (2007) holds that original poor public housing residents will also unlikely be the ultimate long-term primary beneficiaries of current educational reform initiatives in these newly constructed neighborhoods.
Places: Areas of Ongoing Debate Among Researchers

How well are mixed-income developments working?

Mixed-income developments are the most visible expression of the Plan for Transformation and therefore merit special scrutiny. Perhaps because the completion dates for many of the mixed-income developments are still well into the future, as noted earlier, there is little definitive research on outcomes in mixed-income developments. Work on early outcomes from Joseph (2010) identifies some early successes, such as high levels of satisfaction from both groups about the physical redevelopment efforts. Yet the work also suggests that some of the anticipated outcomes, such as cross-class interaction, are unlikely to occur in mixed-income developments (a finding that is consistent with what researchers in other cities have observed).

When Does a Lower Neighborhood Poverty Rate Become Experientially Significant?

There is an assumption in the literature that residing in lower poverty neighborhoods is beneficial for low-income people. However, there is little consensus about the precise income threshold level required for low-income residents to benefit from living in a higher income neighborhood. HUD developed criteria for defining “high poverty” and “low poverty” neighborhoods when devising the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program in the early 1990s, identifying “high poverty” neighborhoods as census tracts with 40 percent or more households in poverty, and “low poverty” tracts as those with no more than 10 percent impoverished (Polikoff 2006, 264). Boston reports that, "families relocated to lower poverty neighborhoods when they relocated with vouchers or moved to a mixed-income development." By contrast (and not surprisingly), the neighborhood poverty level for families who went from one public housing unit to another public housing unit barely changed: from 46% poverty to 45% poverty. Families with HCVs went from 46.9% poverty neighborhoods to 26% poverty neighborhoods. Families moving into the new mixed-income community went from 48% poverty neighborhoods to 36.7% poverty (which is still close to the threshold for “high
poverty”). In other words, despite moves in the direction of lower poverty neighborhoods, all categories of Plan for Transformation placements delivered residents to neighborhoods that were, on average, still closer to “high poverty” tracts than to “low poverty” ones.

Beyond this, there are further questions about how best to interpret the significance of “poverty deconcentration” that has been advanced by the Plan for Transformation. At base, the gains from deconcentrated poverty that go to larger numbers of families--those who leave public housing for other neighborhoods--are both modest (i.e., many still live in areas of high poverty) and inevitable because any new neighborhood that isn’t public housing is likely to have a lower poverty rate. In 1999 public housing was located in the highest poverty neighborhoods in the city of Chicago. In short, it is doubtful whether it would actually be possible for residents to move to neighborhoods with higher levels of poverty than public housing neighborhoods. Any comparisons between poverty rates in 1999 public housing neighborhoods and poverty rates in 2007 post-public housing destination neighborhoods reveal little more than the obvious fact that a move from the city’s highest poverty tracts to anywhere else represents an improvement. Moreover, while this is a statistically significant improvement, many question whether this kind of modest reduction in poverty leads to an experientially significant improvement in the lives of residents. For all the efforts to define an "opportunity" neighborhood, it remains to be seen whether there are particular thresholds of neighborhood poverty reduction that trigger other sorts of improvements in the lives of the least economically advantaged.

Galster (2009, 19) suggests that, “there is a substantial body of U.S. econometric literature suggesting that a variety of negative behavioral outcomes occur for residents when the neighborhood poverty rate exceeds a range of 15-20%.” Most settings for CHA residents, after the Plan for Transformation as well as before it, exceed this threshold. It would be useful for researchers to replicate such studies for CHA-associated neighborhoods. Better still would be if research about poverty rate thresholds could be conducted in a way that includes experiential data, and not just aggregated econometric data.
Places: New Directions for Research

**How well are the rehabilitated family developments faring?**

At present, little is known about the relative success of the efforts to rehabilitate many CHA family developments. Are there some rehabilitated family public housing developments that seem to be faring better than others? Are there any rehabilitated family developments that are as well managed and secure as the new mixed-income communities? What factors account for differential success?

**How will the CHA’s Property Investment Initiative work out?**

Researchers need to measure the impact of CHA's effort to purchase foreclosed properties and other efforts to enhance the scattered site public housing stock. Scattered site public housing represents about 10 percent of the total commitment of units under the Plan for Transformation, but has not been subjected to systematic research. It would be very useful to compare outcomes for residents in scattered-site versus development-based housing or using Housing Choice Vouchers.

**Are neighborhood conditions near the mixed-income development changing because of these new communities?**

Research by both Joseph (2010) and BPI (2009) shows that most neighborhoods where the mixed-income developments are sited lack retail and other neighborhood services. While early work on mixed-income neighborhoods suggested that such services would materialize through market demand from middle-income residents, BPI (2009) argues that needed neighborhood services may only come about through additional concerted public-private intervention. Because the redevelopment is at an early stage, these debates will remain unresolved for some time and it is possible that services may develop through the intervention BPI prescribes.
Thus, a number of questions remain: How accessible to mixed-income development sites are social services such as health clinics, food pantries and counseling services? How accessible to mixed-income development sites are other community facilities such as libraries, parks, recreational facilities and shopping centers? It is also important to assess if residents are aware of and satisfied with the neighborhood services. Do residents know about and approve of the community facilities in their neighborhoods? Finally, because self sufficiency is such an important goal for residents, there needs to be an assessment of employment accessibility: Are residents who are working or seeking work able to find job opportunities nearby and/or accessible by public transportation?

Neighborhood level safety is also a concern: what are the crime levels, including property crime, violent crime, illegal drug activity and gang violence in the mixed-income development neighborhoods?

**Are neighborhood conditions near the rehabilitated family public housing sites changing because of this investment?**

As is the case for mixed-income developments, a similar set of questions apply regarding neighborhood conditions in the redeveloped public housing sites. Since the focus of rehabilitation at these sites has mostly been on the physical rehabilitation of the public housing itself, there may be little change in the conditions of the surrounding neighborhood. It is still crucial that we understand the neighborhood setting. Thus, the same questions just posed about mixed-income communities need answering in these places, as well. Neighborhood level safety is also of special concern, as both Popkin (2007) and Sullivan (2003) have underscored: what are the crime levels, including property crime, violent crime, illegal drug activity and gang violence in the neighborhood surrounding rehabilitated public housing? Creation of new mixed-income communities has been touted as a catalyst for positive change in the broader neighborhood: Are there any cases where public housing rehabilitation has triggered additional neighborhood investment?
What are the neighborhood conditions and amenities like in the communities where those with Housing Choice Vouchers reside?

Similarly, researchers should investigate the neighborhood conditions experienced by voucher holders. Many of the same questions asked about neighborhood conditions for residents in mixed-income housing sites and in rehabilitated public housing sites also apply to the neighborhoods where HCV holders reside.

More research needs to be conducted on the impact of voucher holders on receiving neighborhoods. In Chicago, this would need to map the locations of all 35,000 voucher-holders, not just the 3,800 10-1-1999 households that have chosen them to date.

What are the neighborhood conditions like surrounding the rehabilitated sites for senior housing?

A slightly different set of questions applies to the neighborhood conditions for seniors living in rehabilitated senior sites, even though most seniors may not have moved away from their original neighborhood as a result of the Plan for Transformation. The most important questions here are: how accessible are the health care services, mental health services and social services that exist to help seniors with their physical, emotional and social needs? Are seniors aware of and satisfied with these community facilities? Also, especially for seniors who previously resided in family public housing developments (or in ‘senior’ buildings that also housed non-seniors), it is important to assess neighborhood crime and senior resident perceptions of it. How do seniors feel about their level of safety in their neighborhoods?

How do the neighborhood conditions compare among residential settings?

The series of questions listed above also calls for a comparative study of neighborhood conditions in the places inhabited by voucher holders versus those places that feature traditional public housing developments, mixed-income developments or housing for seniors.
How does accessibility to social services such as health clinics, food pantries and counseling services compare across neighborhood settings? How about accessibility to other community facilities such as libraries, parks, recreational opportunities and shopping centers? How does residential awareness of and satisfied with the neighborhood services compare? How does employment accessibility compare: how well are residents who are working or seeking work able to find job opportunities nearby and/or accessible by public transportation? Finally, how does neighborhood level safety compare?

**What is the role of public schools and charter schools in the success of the Plan for Transformation?**

How has school performance compared for CHA residents relocated out of public housing to other neighborhoods using vouchers, to mixed-income communities, and to rehabilitated public housing? It is not enough to study the quality of the schools; it is also important to follow individual students. There has been some Chapin Hall work on this, but it has not been published. Also, it is not just a matter of the impact of schools on students relocated by the Plan for Transformation; there are also questions about the ways that the Plan for Transformation has affected the schools.

Given the national policy move towards investing in "Choice Neighborhoods," it will be important to frame research to measure the comparative impact of interventions that target housing only, versus those that target both housing and schools, versus those that attempt to influence housing, schools, and retail.

**What is the impact of the Plan for Transformation on the Chicago region?**

There is not yet much research on the metropolitan impacts of the Plan. More ethnographic sorts of work is needed in communities on the South Side and in the south suburbs that have been most affected by the influx of former residents from CHA developments. The goal of the Gautreaux decision and of the Moving to Opportunity experiment was to move public
housing residents out of poor inner city communities and into more affluent suburbs. Although there is some evidence that 10-1-1999 residents have moved to the South Side suburbs, the socioeconomic situation in these places likely represents little improvement from higher poverty neighborhoods within the city of Chicago. Boston's (2009) data show that some 10-1-1999 residents exited the CHA system with vouchers but the data do not show where these residents moved. A variety of questions about potential suburban destinations arise: Did any 10-1-1999 households move to lower poverty or affluent suburbs? If so, what was the process by which these residents located their new homes and how are these residents faring?

4. RESEARCH ON THE PLAN FOR TRANSFORMATION: LOOKING FORWARD

Looking across the research conducted about the Chicago Housing Authority’s Plan for Transformation, it is not surprising that smallest set of questions and answers is the set that provides conclusive answers to clearly formulated questions. More often, important questions have been answered by conflicting or contradictory findings, confirming that the Plan for Transformation has yielded highly mixed results. While progress has been made toward resolving some debates, many more remain. Some of these debates could be productively engaged by convening researchers who are working independently on similar topics. At present, much research about the Plan for Transformation is descriptive; greater collaboration among researchers could yield testable hypotheses that would give these descriptions more analytical power. At the same time, convening researchers could enable them to discuss their methods with one another, and could also yield a greater consensus on the definition of key terms such as “neighborhood quality” and “self-sufficiency.” Without some consensus on metrics and definitions it is hard to know how to identify “success” in a consistent way.

There is also a significant time lag between research and publication, such that a lot of published research to date reflects the first phase of tenant relocation, and therefore does not account for changes in policy and procedures since that time. One part of a future research agenda could include efforts to repeat older studies in a way that would reveal the effects of such policy changes.
Frequently, too, pressing issues about the processes and outcomes of the Plan for Transformation have not yet been formulated into researchable questions. As with any major contemporary policy initiative, many questions remain unanswered and the existing research suggests many intriguing directions for future research, as well as areas that are currently conspicuous by their omission. Many of the most obvious unanswered questions for the Plan for Transformation are those that can only be resolved once sufficient time has elapsed to measure outcomes. Yet other intriguing research questions have not been taken up and can and should be addressed in the more immediate term. Addressing such issues becomes an urgent next step.
SECTION 4. RESEARCH ON RELOCATION AND PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

Sections 4-6 of this Report now step back to provide more in-depth discussion of research that undergirds the findings that have been outlined and categorized in Section 3. Section 4 is centered on research on relocation and other processes of Plan implementation, while Section 5 focuses on outcomes for public housing tenants, and Section 6 collects and describes research on outcomes for housing and neighborhood places.

Research Analyses of Implementation Processes

It is beyond the scope of this report to attempt an overall assessment of the successes and shortcomings of the CHA’s Plan for Transformation. That noted, many of the research efforts that have addressed the people and places affected by the Plan have found it impossible to disentangle these findings from the larger question of how the Plan has been implemented. Most of these implementation questions, however, center on the effects of the redevelopment process on residents. This section will cover research on the relocation process in several directions and dimensions: relocation to CHA properties, to the private market, and to mixed-income developments. It will also review research on the performance of relocation and employment counseling and issues of lease compliance. It also discusses scholarly work that has identified challenges to the implementation of the plan, including large numbers of ‘hard-to-house’ tenants and a changing housing market. Finally, the last part of this section reviews scholarly work on how implementation has been affected by tenant-initiated court action.

The implementation of the Plan for Transformation has yielded some unforeseen challenges, especially during the early years (2000-2003) of the Plan. In evaluations of the Plan’s earliest phases, researchers took issue with many aspects of its implementation. In the view of the CHA’s first independent monitor, Thomas Sullivan⁶, only the building closures proceeded according to plan (Sullivan, 2003). Similarly, Kristine Berg (2004) chronicled conflicts at the planning stage and argued that this negatively affected the implementation of the plan, leading

⁶ Following the conclusion of Thomas Sullivan’s service as Independent Monitor, reports continued on an annual basis under the direction of Rita Fry. Some of Sullivan’s reports were circulated more publicly, in contrast to the work of Fry, so only Sullivan’s work is referenced in this report.
to rushed relocations and inadequate social support for the residents. Bennett, Hudspeth and Wright (2006) characterized the redevelopment process as "flawed with haphazard processes of planning, demolition and temporary relocation." More recently, given the market downturn starting in 2008, priorities, deadlines and expectations have shifted once again.

**Research on Relocation**

Some researchers report that the implementation of resident relocation in particular has been problematic. As Popkin (2010) notes, "Chicago has faced a set of circumstances that has made relocation especially difficult." These difficulties include the large number of households (potentially more than 25,000) that need to be relocated, the fact that these households are quite disadvantaged, and performance issues with the resident services agencies charged with providing relocation assistance and case management services.

These challenges commenced during the first stages of the transformation plan while the housing authority struggled to develop an effective relocation system. A number of authors document rushed relocation efforts. In his report to the CHA Sullivan (2003) observed that ever changing bureaucratic deadlines conflicted with fixed demolition deadlines such that building closure dates fast approached leaving only a short time for relocation. In consequence, "A number of residents were not moved until the last few weeks of the relocation process" (Sullivan, 2003). In their study of the Robert Taylor homes, Venkatesh and Celimni (2004) found that 89% of families living at Robert Taylor homes had not relocated one month before building closure.

Other research recounts mismanagement of cases. The CHA "lost" some residents even before they could receive services to which they were entitled. Some residents were unable to move into the private market using vouchers. These residents ended up in what was labeled "temporary" housing in other CHA buildings. Some of this temporary housing was also slated for demolition (Popkin, 2006a).
One major study, the *CHA Relocation Counseling Assessment*, tracked 190 heads-of-household randomly selected from the resident population of 11 buildings originally slated for closure in 1999 for a 12-month period as they went through the relocation process (Popkin et al., 2002b). The findings from this early study of relocation underscored how difficult it would be for the CHA to implement a successful relocation system: a large proportion of its residents faced serious barriers in moving out of CHA housing. For example, at the time of the 12-month follow-up, just 38 percent of the 190 households had been able to move to a private market unit using vouchers. Some of the remaining residents still lived in their original housing. Others were moved, temporarily, to another public housing unit in a different CHA building, called a “make ready” unit (Popkin, 2010).

Since those early years, however, many researchers note that the relocation process has improved. The process now includes education sessions on the relocation process. There are also relocation planning meetings. Residents receive notices of upcoming relocation plans and are assigned to a relocation counselor for assistance. Counselors can offer residents three housing options: mixed-income housing, a Housing Choice (Section 8) Voucher, or traditional public housing. Following the terms of the Relocation Rights Contract, leaseholders are asked to identify both their permanent choice as well as a preference for temporary housing (voucher or public housing) should the CHA need to relocate them before their permanent choice becomes available. Further, starting in 2002, interested residents could volunteer for the Gautreaux Two mobility program, which provides intensive mobility counseling to assist residents who elect to move to a low-poverty, racially mixed community (Pashup et al., 2005). As researchers note, the tenants' relocation experience varies by relocation group and the sections below will discuss these different relocation experiences.

**Research on Relocation to CHA Properties**

Research shows that the process of relocating displaced residents to other CHA properties has led to some unforeseen outcomes. Two sets of residents have been relocated to CHA properties (not including seniors, who have generally returned to the same family development following its rehabilitation). The first set of relocatees is composed of residents
who wish to remain in family public housing, either in mixed-income developments or in rehabilitated public housing developments. The second set of residents contains those who wish to move to the private market using a voucher but are unable to do so, for reasons that will be detailed below. For both sets of residents, a number of problems plagued relocation in the early years of the plan. According to Sullivan (2003), the conditions found in the "make ready" units in other public housing developments were "deplorable." For example, a number of the CHA buildings to which the residents were moved contained units that had been uninhabited for years. The buildings were aged and the plumbing and electrical systems were in poor, undependable conditions. Additionally, residents faced tight time schedules for building closures and CHA staffs' "rigid adherence to those dates, led inevitably to the ascendance of quantity over quality in the preparation of make-ready units [in public housing]" (Sullivan, p.18).

Sullivan's team interviewed CHA staff regarding these conditions and found that gang related activity in particular had interfered with relocation. Staff recounted how "the last minute rush was due in large part to residents not advising the CHA representatives early on that they did not want to move to certain buildings because of safety (gang related) problems." Consequently, the Operations Department had to switch over to preparing units in other buildings sometimes during the last few weeks of the process. While these buildings were safer in terms of gang activity, staff acknowledged that several of these buildings, such as some at Stateway Gardens and Washington Park, were quite dilapidated and required extensive repair work. But Sullivan also noted that "the inflexible adherence by the CHA relocation team to the prefixed dates for emptying buildings" (p.18) was another contributing factor to the rushed relocation. Apparently, despite this last minute effort to move households to safe, gang-free buildings, residents were still moved to dangerous buildings. Sullivan found that "in some instances that were reported to us during Phase II, residents were moved to make-ready units in buildings inhabited by members of gangs antagonistic to members, relatives or friends of the moving families" (p.19).

Sullivan anticipated that the gang related problems would continue during Phase III (2002-2003) relocation activities. Interviews with a Chicago Police commander suggested that the
police anticipated an increase in gang activity and violence as a result of Phase III relocation efforts. According to Sullivan's report, "Phase III will present new challenges to the police, especially, as the number of gallery buildings are closed and demolished, which will probably create gang competition and violence for control of the remaining buildings" (p.77). Follow-up studies, if they exist, were not made available to us to determine if the anticipated gang activity occurred.

Researchers have identified another possible obstacle to achieving goals set by the CHA for some of those seeking to remain CHA tenants. Starting in 2008, CHA introduced a work requirement for residents living in renovated family properties and scattered sites. And, taking effect in 2009, all residents who are neither senior nor disabled must be working 15 hours a week or be involved in job training, educational or volunteer commitments that prepare them for work (Parkes et al., 2009). Popkin anticipates that many residents will struggle to meet these new expectations for work and workforce preparation. The increased expectations and goals for those living in rehabbed buildings created new challenges for both residents and the CHA. In these properties "residents face numerous obstacles to achieving stable employment and becoming self-sufficient" (Metropolitan Planning Council, 2008, p.1). Moreover, residents living in scattered sites have required different outreach and engagement efforts, because it is not feasible to offer site-based resources. The implementation of new work requirements may be difficult, as well, because of downturn in the economy, detailed in sections below.

**Implementation of Relocation to Private Market Housing**

While, by 2009, more than 3,800 original households affected by the Plan for Transformation lived in the private rental market using Housing Choice Vouchers (CHA 2009), the implementation of this process has also encountered some unexpected difficulties, especially during the early phase of the Plan. Popkin et al. (2002b) assessed 190 heads-of-household randomly selected from the resident population of 11 buildings at Madden-Wells, and found that during this early phase, only a small proportion of those referred for services succeeded in moving with vouchers. The assessment raised concerns about resident needs. The problems
encountered in this process included difficulties in locating a unit in a timely fashion, lack of counseling or information on suitable units, and resistance from landlords. In some instances, researchers have found that relocation has been especially difficult. Venkatesh (2002) in his study of the Robert Taylor homes reported that just 13% of the relocating families had made a successful transition to their new communities (although he did not clarify exactly what counted as the threshold for ‘success’).

Authors have documented that time constraints affected residents' housing choices. Finding suitable units required residents to devote an unforeseen amount of time to their housing searches. As Sullivan (2003) notes, "The process of locating a private housing rental unit with an HCV is more time-consuming and complex [than moving to another CHA unit]." While CHA counselors encouraged residents to search for rental units on their own, many families did not have transportation to conduct searches. Moreover, lacking experience in the private rental market, many did not have the skills necessary to locate and secure a unit. As the building closing deadlines approached, large numbers of HCV-eligible families remained in CHA buildings. Adding to this difficulty, there were too few counselors to address the residents' needs. These "imminent building-empty dates, and the relatively small number of relocation counselors, caused a rush to place families in rental units. This in turn led inevitably to placing families hurriedly" (Sullivan, 23). Thus, Sullivan concluded that for those leaseholders who relocated in 2002 and in early 2003, known as Phase II leaseholders, the contractual requirement of extensive counseling designed to produce informed housing choices was left unfulfilled. Residents then found themselves back in racially segregated neighborhoods, populated overwhelmingly by low-income families. This dynamic may have changed during the subsequent years of implementation, an issue that will be discussed in the outcomes section. Moreover, housing quality was overlooked or given little attention when residents picked their rental units.

Relocation efforts in the earlier years of the Plan for Transformation were also hampered because residents in some cases did not receive enough information or counseling about how to locate desirable units. In other cases, authors document how residents received bad information. According to Venkatesh and Celimni (2004), "some families were only shown
units in segregated neighborhoods heavily populated by other voucher users because the
counselors had close relationships with the landlords in these areas" (p.19). Sullivan
corroborates that "many families were taken only to units in [segregated areas] in which the
counselors had close relations with certain landlords" (p.24). These areas were also heavily
populated by poor families and many other HCV holders. Venkatesh and Celimni
documented how "Relocation counseling agencies used pressure tactics: Relocation
counseling agencies assigned to help families find private-market units did little to help
families move outside of poor, segregated areas" (Venkatesh and Celimni, 2004).

A lack of information and miscommunication also influenced relocation. According to
Venkatesh, "Tenants continue to have difficulties receiving timely, accurate information on
relocation and service provision." (Venkatesh, 2002) As a consequence, Williams, Fischer
and Russ (2000) found that rather than getting information about the Plan for Transformation
and its procedures from relocation counselors most residents relied on informal networks of
present and former public housing occupants. As Sullivan (2003) reported, "One of the
problems that I frequently heard during Phase II was that too many different persons and
organizations were involved in telling residents about the same aspects of the relocation
process, often providing in consistent and sometimes contradictory information and advice"
(p.5).

Researchers identified two features of the counseling system used in the early years that might
have contributed to the suboptimal quality of the counseling. Williams, Fischer and Russ
(2003) found that the system of service provision was "fragmented and burdensome for
families." That system of providing services to families with Housing Choice Vouchers
(HCVs) involved referring them to a "Good Neighbor" orientation, a CHAC Inc. relocation
counselor, a service connector or a developer. All of these providers had some responsibility
for social services and each required separate interviews and multiple screening for lease
compliance. The authors concluded that, "Repeated screening interviews waste contractor
resources that could be spent on direct service" (Williams, Fischer and Russ, 2003). The
quality of the counseling also appeared to be a result of the CHA's outsourcing assistance to

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7 CHAC is a private training, consulting and management firm contracted to assist with relocation.
residents in moving with HCVs. The CHA contracted with private firms to assist in the HCV relocation process and these firms were "compensated by completed placements, without consideration to the number of units shown, their condition or location… Almost all of the rental units were in financially depressed, racially segregated areas on the west and south sides of Chicago" (Sullivan, 22). As a result, there is an "established pattern of the vast majority of HCV rentals being in the two racially segregated areas on the south and west sides of Chicago containing a high percent of families who are below the poverty line, many of whom are HCV holders" (Sullivan, 25).

Sullivan added, however, that changes to the relocation counseling contracts for Phase III suggested that these problems would be addressed in Phase III. The relocation counseling contracts for Phase III/2003 required the counselors to identify prospective units in "Low-Poverty Areas" (defined here as census tracts with no more than 23.5% of families having income below the poverty level), and "Opportunity Areas" (Low-Poverty areas with no more than 30% of resident families being African American). Moreover, the contract prohibits identification of units in a "Moderately Subsidized Area" (census tracts with a high percent of HCV holders and more than 23.5% of families with income below the poverty level). To incentivize compliance, the counseling agencies are both penalized financially if they place families in units in Moderately Subsidized Areas as well as rewarded for placements in Opportunity or Low Poverty Areas. Yet Popkin (2010) concluded that while the relocation system attempts to be comprehensive and inclusive, the relocation system would likely still relegate a substantial number of families to public housing or to higher poverty neighborhoods.

Some research indicates that residents had trouble finding quality housing. In the NORC survey (2007), when asked how difficult it was to "finding a place you liked," 53 percent of the leaseholders who were currently living in an HCV unit or who indicated that an HCV was their permanent or temporary housing choice and who were not currently in a new or rehabbed CHA unit reported that it was a either a "big problem" (22%) or "some problem" (31%).
Other factors beyond counseling, timing issues and rules have prevented residents from moving to opportunity neighborhoods. Several authors have documented that many landlords in desirable neighborhoods will not rent to HCV holders (Sullivan, 2003; Thompson, 2006). Other research shows that some residents choose to live in neighborhoods that are familiar and close to family. These tend to be higher poverty neighborhoods. Also, residents who select HCVs but have no income are provided with a stipend with which to pay the monthly utility bills, yet this arrangement comes at a cost. As Sullivan details, "when this is done, the amount of the stipend is deducted from the amount CHAC has to pay for rent, so that the units available to those families tend to be in less desirable, more distressed areas of the city" (Sullivan, 29).

Popkin (2010) recounts how rules, both for those seeking to move into mixed-income housing and to a lesser extent for those who have chosen vouchers, may exclude residents from housing opportunities. As part of the redesigned relocation process, CHA residents all completed a housing choice survey and were offered counseling both to assist their move out of their existing unit as well as to support their potential move into the housing they have chosen. For households hoping to move into the new mixed-income developments, the CHA’s Minimum Tenant Selection Plan required families to meet a number of strict criteria: they must "be up to date on their rent and utilities; have no outstanding debts or lease violations; pass a three-year criminal background check; and provide documentation that all children are attending school regularly. The most controversial requirement is that all household members over the age of 18 must be employed at least 30 hours a week" (Popkin, 2010). Slightly less strict rules apply to residents who have chosen vouchers. Yet Popkin (2010) predicts that voucher holders, too, might not be able to meet the program criteria, especially if they fall behind on rent or utilities or have poor credit or have a history of problems with property management. Thus, many residents may be prevented from making opportunity moves.

As Lewis and Sinha (2007) write, "Mobility seems to be determined by forces beyond conventional counseling. Mobility initiatives are a weak intervention for changing the patterns. If interventions can neither coerce movers to shift their preferences, nor force
communities to be more receptive to low-income African Americans they will fail." Residents also seem to fear that trouble will move with them to their new neighborhoods. Some are concerned that gangs will move into areas where many Housing Choice Voucher residents are moving. Their concern is evident to counselors. As Sullivan (2003) reports, "HCV relocation counselors have been asked by residents looking for HCV units to drive through alleys in various neighborhoods so they could check for graffiti of rival gangs" (77).

Also, as noted earlier, there is a limited supply of units in the private market for large families and, consequently, large families often have difficulty finding apartments with three or more bedrooms in the rental market (Great Cities Institute, 1999). For decades, CHA housing has been one of the few reliable sources of large units for low-income families. For example, Popkin, Cunningham and Woodley (2003) detail how "Wells' remaining population includes a substantial number of large families: nearly half (45 percent or 258 households) need at least a three-bedroom home. Even more of a concern, most of these (34 percent of the total population) need at least a four-bedroom home" (Popkin, Cunningham and Woodley, 2003, 9).

The Relocation Process to Mixed-income Developments

The redevelopment and relocation process for mixed-income developments has proceeded somewhat differently than outlined by administrators at the beginning of the Plan for Transformation. As Hunt and Lau (2008) note, "The mixed-income concept is central to the Plan for Transformation, and it originates from a belief among most planners that the concentration of poverty was the single most important influence in public housing’s demise." As of 2007, according to Boston, just 1,035 of the 15,416 10-1-1999 CHA public housing non-senior households (i.e., those eligible for a “Right of Return”)

According to March 2010 CHA figures, however, 2,163 10-1-1999 households had relocated to mixed income housing (CHA personal communication, May 25, 2010). The reason for the difference between this figure and Boston's remains unclear especially since the CHA only completed about 500 public housing units in mixed-income developments between 2007 and 2009. At the end of fiscal year 2007, CHA reported that 2,472 public housing units in mixed income housing were complete (Chicago Housing Authority, 2008b). The CHA reported that
mixed-income housing. To a considerable extent, unforeseen issues with mixed-income developments have influenced this relocation process. Some of this is due to the downturn in the housing market that commenced in 2008, the restrictive rule structures of mixed-income developments, and unforeseen resident reactions to the prospect of living in a newly redeveloped mixed-income development.

The new mixed-income housing was constructed primarily on 10 CHA sites across the city (Metropolitan Planning Council, 2008). As of November 2009, developers of mixed-income developments had created over 7,000 homes, with more than 2,800 of them for CHA residents and the rest either market-rate (2,771) or affordable (1,553) (CHA, 2008a, Partnership for New Communities, 2009). Many of the challenges affecting the process of building new mixed-income communities, however, center on the non-CHA tenants. According to the Metropolitan Planning Council, "the 'mix' of units within these developments continues to be a challenge. As highlighted by MPC’s November 2005 Update, the affordable for-sale housing component that could provide needed housing options for more moderate-income working families, above and beyond the public housing and market-rate options, has proved very costly to build, as public subsidies are not as readily available to bridge that gap" (Metropolitan Planning Council, 2008, p.4). Additionally, the authors predicted that, because the market-rate development currently subsidizes much of the Plan’s affordable housing, mixed-income developments would likely be affected by the declining housing market (Metropolitan Planning Council, 2008), an issue that is impacting the entire plan and which will be discussed below. Another challenge, according to the CHA’s Linda Kaiser, is “due primarily to protocols developed to ensure that former CHA residents have choices and access. Now we’re experiencing unanticipated obstacles to filling the public housing homes in a timely manner, and this we have to change” (quoted in Metropolitan Planning Council, 2008, p 2-3). That is, the Relocation Rights Contract allows residents to reject a unit and still

2,977 public housing units in mixed income housing were completed by March 2010 (CHA, 2010). Since only about 500 public housing units came online from 2007 to 2009, the reasons for the 1,000 household discrepancy between Boston's data and the CHA data are not clear. A CHA spokesperson attributed this discrepancy to possible issues with client ID coding, in which the same Right of Return household could have been given a different code when returning to public housing after temporary use of an HCV (CHA, personal correspondence, May 25, 2010).
remain eligible. Thus, there is less pressure on residents to move into units they don't find acceptable and, when a resident rejects a unit, delays result because the leasing agent must find another eligible resident to fill the unit.

Others have found that some tenants express apprehension about living in mixed-income developments. Some fear that they will not be eligible due to as yet unknown site-specific requirements. Others worry that they will be segregated and/or stigmatized in that new environment. Some anticipate that gangs will follow them and disrupt the new development (Williams, Fischer and Russ, 2003). Joseph's (2008) findings corroborate some of these fears. He finds that there are strong selection issues in who lives in mixed-income developments. "First, there are specific selection criteria, established by the Chicago Housing Authority and by a ‘working group’ of local stakeholders at each new development, which residents must meet in order to be eligible for a new unit. The basic criteria include lease compliance in current unit, working at least 30 hours a week, no unpaid utility bills, no recent criminal convictions, and passing a drug test." As a result, a higher proportion of residents than anticipated have decided not to return even when units have been made available (Popkin, 2007).

**Research on Counseling**

As noted above, authors attribute some issues with relocation to the counseling programs put in place during the early years of the Plan for Transformation. The primary resident counseling program for CHA residents was the Service Connector program. Service connectors were social service agencies contracted by CHA to provide tenants with employment counseling and placement and referrals to address problems of physical and mental health, substance abuse or family dysfunction. Consequently, they were to give information about available community resources and were to focus on four areas – employment, lease compliance, community integration and family stability. The Service Connector was made available to all of the CHA public housing residents and the program included case managers (longer-term, intensive and direct service) and service coordinators (who provided motivation, set appointments, set goals and objectives for residents to maintain
housing stability) (Sullivan, 2003). Their role was seen as critical in helping families to become and remain compliant with their leases (Williams, Fischer and Russ, 2003). Again, lease compliance is necessary in order for residents to remain eligible for CHA housing or a HCV.

The defined priority of the Service Connector agencies was to focus on employment readiness and placement (Williams, Fischer and Russ, 2003). Yet Williams, Fischer and Russ (2003) found that funding was inadequate to provide for intensive services to families that need additional assistance before being ready for employment. Many informants reported that the Service Connector program reached only those households that were candidates for employment, and that families with serious problems were not being served. There was an ongoing concern that some families would not remain or become lease compliant without significant social services (Williams, Fischer and Russ, 2003). Sullivan, too, found that "The almost unanimous view of the many persons with whom we spoke is that, insofar as families relocated in Phase II were concerned, the Service Connector Program DID NOT accomplish – or even come close to accomplishing – its announced objectives as described above…largely because the funding was woefully inadequate" (p.47). Sullivan adds, "the case managers were overwhelmed by the number of families, the breadth and depth of many families’ problems, the lack of resources available to the connector agencies, and the time they spent on paperwork and at meetings" (p. 51). A frequent criticism of the program was that its case loads were excessively high—in 2003 they were reduced from a high of over 100 to 1 to a still-high 55 to 1—such that case managers are unable to provide effective services (Sullivan 2003; Popkin, 2010).

Due to these issues, the CHA worked to overhaul the Service Connector program. In partnership with the Chicago Department of Human Services (CDHS), in late 2007 CHA replaced the existing Service Connector program with FamilyWorks, which is an outcomes-based service delivery system. This program aims to help residents make final housing choices and address workforce development needs. Agencies receiving contracts from CDHS aim to serve approximately 9,000 CHA families, including those using HCVs, living in or moving into rehabilitated family properties, scattered sites and mixed-income developments
(Chicago Department of Human Services, 2008). According to Popkin (2006a), "The CHA gradually refined and improved its relocation and supportive service system and now has a very sophisticated and elaborate relocation process." Nonetheless, many residents were neglected under the original Service Connector Program and the effects of this impacted their ultimate outcomes.

By mid-2008, the CHA assumed direct control of the FamilyWorks program. The program formally began in April 2008, but full implementation was not underway until several months later, partially due to lengthy contract negotiations and other start-up issues (Parkes et al., 2009). Parkes et al. argue that the FamilyWorks model will better serve CHA residents because of its emphasis on employment and measurable outcomes. Moreover, in an initial assessment, they found that "the FamilyWorks model was universally raised by key informants as one that has a clear mission to get residents employed and permanently housed." The initiative includes a clinical component and specialists who are trained to address specific resident needs. Moreover, in contrast to Service Connector's referral-based model, because FamilyWorks requires an outcomes-based approach to service delivery, this should provide an incentive to program administrators.

**Relocation and the Hard to House**

Research shows that relocation has been also affected by unforeseen needs and numbers of those residents who are frequently described as “hard to house”. Popkin, Cunningham and Burt (2005) define the hard to house as, "public housing residents who are at risk of losing their housing for reasons that go beyond affordability. They are residents who have personal or family circumstances that make it difficult for them to fit into standard relocation options and who require or are best served by alternative housing models" (p.5). As Sullivan (2003) noted, the hard to house were particularly underserved by the Service Connector program: "A primary emphasis of the Service Connector Program was finding employment for adult family members. But lack of jobs was just a part of larger, deeper problems facing many residents. Many of those in need of social services had problems so severe that they required extensive
counseling and a variety of intensive social services before they could become employable" (p.49). He also notes that many of the residents whom connectors helped place in jobs were unable to hold them for more than a few weeks. Sullivan estimates that the percentages of these kinds of residents ranges from 40 to 80%, depending on the development. In their study of Ida B. Wells and Madden Park, Popkin, Cunningham and Burt (2005) found that up to 72% of the residents in the residents at risk survey were categorized as "hard to house." They conclude that, "Meeting the challenge of housing these residents—families with special needs, lease violators, illegal residents, and the truly homeless—will require a coordinated response on the part of the housing authority, city agencies, private service providers, and the philanthropic community in Chicago" (Popkin, Cunningham and Burt 2005).

The Plan for Transformation and the Economy

Most of the research on the Plan for Transformation to date was conducted during a tight housing market and a period of low unemployment. For HCV holders, one consequence of a tight housing market was a limited supply of available housing. Availability of units in desirable neighborhoods has also impacted relocation patterns. As Bennett, Smith and Wright (2006) observed, "It is a remarkable juxtaposition of events that even as PHAs across American demolish residential units, offering their displaced former tenants housing vouchers to find shelter in the private market, in the nation's major metropolitan areas a growing affordable housing gap has emerged" (p. 11). Just prior to the implementation of the Plan for Transformation, a HUD-funded study found that the rental market in the region was "tight." The vacancy rate was 4.2 percent and most of the available affordable rental housing was located in "softer" markets on the South and West Sides of the city that were predominantly African-American and relatively poor. The research predicted that there was a chance residents might end up in highly segregated neighborhoods (Smith, 2006, p. 94).

Much research noted how redeveloped sites were benefiting from gentrification and a rise in property values. With the crash in the housing market, however, ownership units in the redeveloped sites have become harder to sell.
While the CHA avows that it has "not veered from the challenge of transforming Chicago’s public housing stock, even during the current downturn of our economy," the Authority also notes that it faces many challenges to reaching the unit delivery goals. According to the CHA, several factors have affected the unit delivery schedule, including the "current housing market conditions, rising cost of development and rehabilitation, compliance with accessibility requirements, and physical conditions" (Chicago Housing Authority, 2008a). This has caused the CHA to change some of its plans, including delaying construction (Chicago Housing Authority, 2008a).

Thousands of Chicago homes were foreclosed during 2008 and 2009 due to the downturn in the real estate market, which the Chicago Housing Authority (2008) frames as both a liability and an opportunity. According to the CHA, they present a liability because many of the foreclosed homes are vacant, and as such they "may negatively impact community safety and property values." The CHA sees the situation as an opportunity as well since these homes can be acquired cheaply. Consequently, the CHA created the Property Investment Initiative (PII) which seeks to acquire, rehabilitate (if necessary), and lease both foreclosed and for sale properties to public housing families.

The situation in the labor force has changed as well. Following 2007 the Chicago area economy went into in a lengthy recession, which entailed significant declines in economic activity and employment. As of early 2010, the Chicago regional labor market for CHA residents remained bleak, and new labor market entrants and workers with sporadic employment histories will encounter difficulties in securing stable employment. Still, Parkes et al. found that some industry sectors such as healthcare services and hospitality may be growing. Nonetheless, they concluded in 2008 that, "Current employment prospects are poor for less skilled workers, ex-offenders, former welfare recipients, and other workers who have extended spells of unemployment. For these individuals, more emphasis on transitional jobs as well as education and training during the current economic downturn will be important" (Parkes, et. al., 2008).
Relocation and the Right to Return

As stipulated by the Relocation Rights contract, residents who lived in CHA units on October 1, 1999 and remained lease compliant are guaranteed the right to return to CHA housing when new or rehabilitated units are completed. In the intervening years, however, in addition to many residents that died, were evicted or moved away, the CHA has been unable to regain contact with approximately 2,900 households holding a right of return, despite protracted efforts that included hiring an outside firm to search for these ‘lost’ residents (CHA personal communication, May 25, 2010). The period between leaving CHA housing with a HCV or transfer and returning to public housing has been several years for most residents, increasing the likelihood that either the CHA would lose contact with some residents or that many residents with HCVs would choose to continue using them. For those residents that the CHA could find, researchers stressed that the CHA should provide information essential to their decision-making about ultimate housing options. According to Williams, Fischer and Russ (2003), "although there is strong interest in encouraging families with HCVs to return to CHA housing, success in this aspect of the Plan for Transformation should be measured not by numbers returning, but by the extent to which families have received all information necessary to make informed decisions and all services needed to remain in compliance with a CHA lease. Levels of informed choice and lease compliance are the appropriate yardsticks of goals met."

In an analysis of CHA Housing Choice Survey data from March 2003, the MPC assessed about 10,000 CHA heads of households who had been relocated, had also completed "choice" clinics and been surveyed to determined their preferences for their future moves. At that time, the vast majority of residents surveyed (89.4 percent) opted to move to new or rehabbed housing when the new apartments became available. Of those families who wanted to remain in CHA housing, 46 percent chose to move with a temporary HCV and 54 percent chose to remain within public housing with the guarantee of the right to return. Just 10.6 percent of those surveyed chose to move permanently to private rental housing using Housing Choice Vouchers (HCVs) (Metropolitan Planning Council, 2003). However, in March and August of 2006, a sample of 666 Phase II and Phase III leaseholders were surveyed about their
housing choices. Results from this survey showed that 55% of the respondents chose to live permanently in redeveloped or rehabilitated public housing (NORC, 2007). While this is still a majority, far fewer residents appeared to be interested in living permanently in new or rehabbed public housing, rather than move with vouchers, than was the case in 2003.

Researchers have identified factors that favor residents continuing with the HCV program rather than returning to new or rehabilitated CHA units. The primary difficulty is the length of time between moving with a temporary Housing Choice Voucher and the construction or rehabilitation of housing. Some families have been renting in the private housing market for up to nine years. Many have adapted to their new situations, some have dropped out of the HCV program, and some have lost contact with the CHA or lost interest in returning. Williams, Fischer and Russ (2003) find that "many residents are affected by their long experience in difficult conditions and dependence on others, with resulting health and psychological problems including depression and asthma, making it more difficult for them to take initiative, stay in touch with CHA and meet the requirements for return." Additional factors also increase the likelihood that HCV holders may not choose to return, despite their stated preferences several years into implementation of the Plan for Transformation. For example, residents with HCVs find it easier to share housing with people not on the lease. They may rely on these off-lease occupants for personal and financial support, and anticipate they will not be able to continue to house off-lease occupants in new CHA developments that would be subject to greater scrutiny than were their former CHA apartments. This perception may be a barrier to returning. Some families may value the flexibility of the HCV program, which enables them to move from time to time to meet changing housing needs and aspirations. They may also seek to remain with HCVs because lease compliance criteria for the HCV program are less stringent than site-specific lease requirements in the mixed-income housing communities. (Williams, Fischer and Russ, 2003).

However, there are also reasons why residents would want to return to CHA housing rather than remain in the HCV program. Some are financial, such as lower maximum rents and greater protection against sharp rent increases, as well as lower utility costs. Additionally, there are some procedural advantages such as full grievance procedures, and assurance of
long-term, rather than year-to-year tenancy (Williams, Fischer and Russ, 2003). Residents may want to return to CHA housing for fear that the funding for vouchers may not renew in perpetuity or that their tenancy may be subject to term limits.

Implementation of moves into new housing may also be affected because residents fail to remain lease compliant, though the numbers of residents struggling to maintain or achieve lease compliance is unclear. In order to be lease compliant, residents must be current on rent and utility payments, be in compliance with the August 15, 2000 lease (including ‘one-strike’ requirements), have no unauthorized tenants living in the unit; and possess a good housekeeping record. Results from the NORC survey showed that almost every leaseholder reported that she or he was lease compliant (98%; n=637 of 649) (NORC, 2007). Yet in Popkin, Cunningham and Woodley's profile of residents in Ida B. Wells and Madden Park they report that "A significant number of households were not lease compliant…Altogether, 22 percent reported at least one lease violation." Popkin, Cunningham and Woodley are not alone in identifying lease compliance as an issue for returning tenants. The housing authority, too, identified lease violators as a serious problem and charged the erstwhile Service Connector program with helping current residents become lease compliant (Popkin, Cunningham and Woodley, 2003). Sullivan found many residents had problems with large unpaid, overdue utility bills and noted that, "when families were attempting to achieve lease compliance in preparation for relocation, these bills were encountered and presented a serious impediment" (p.29). In September 2009, the CHA reported 2347 lease violations since May 2008, but indicated that only 31 households had been evicted. The Authority expected that the rest would be “cured”: more than a thousand had been resolved and the others were in the process of resolution (Jordan, 2009).

Redevelopment and Court Action

Some research has focused on the impact litigation has had on the redevelopment process, both on specific sites as well as on the process in general. Not surprisingly, as the CHA has struggled with relocation, the process has been contentious and occasionally subject to litigation. Two relocation suits have been filed since 1999 (Popkin, 2010). Class action
public impact litigation has historically been the primary legal mechanism public housing reformers use to achieve widespread public housing reforms (Alexander, 2009) and this mechanism has altered the implementation of the Plan for Transformation. Since the Civil Rights era, litigation has been used to combat the CHA's history of building public housing units in racially segregated and impoverished areas (Polikoff 2006; Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000). Alexander recounts that during the 1950s and 60s just one of the 33 projects the CHA constructed was located in an area that was less than eighty-four percent black. This pattern of the CHA locating public housing in segregated neighborhoods prompted CHA tenants to sue the CHA for intentional segregation policies. The resulting Gautreaux lawsuits, one against the CHA and the other against HUD, argued that there had been deliberate racial discrimination in public housing. Ultimately, in 1969, a federal district judge found that the CHA was liable for the intentional discrimination and also issued a judgment order that prohibited the CHA from building any additional public housing in predominately black neighborhoods, unless it also built public housing elsewhere. And, in 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the HUD portion of the case, permitting the Gautreaux program to provide housing for CHA families in white neighborhoods in the Chicago suburbs (Polikoff 2006; Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000). The CHA’s Plan for Transformation has proceeded subject to Gautreaux conditions.

Scholars note that Gautreaux and contemporary legal battles have impacted the Plan for Transformation in several ways. First, court injunctions have slowed the redevelopment process (Miller, 2008). Second, legal contests have altered implementation of the Plan for Transformation and, in some cases, local courts have determined planning outcomes (Wilen, 2006). Lewis and Ward (2004) argue that two generations of lawsuits and consent decrees have shaped the Plan for Transformation. "Gautreaux has influenced the current reform in at least two key ways. First, the leverage created by the various consent decrees issued over the last generation places legal advocates in the unique position of influencing both directly and indirectly the focus and implementation of the current reform. The federal courts can shape the current efforts if the advocates use their standing to challenge what the CHA is doing. A second and subtler influence is almost psychological. Thirty years of litigation have created a climate in which the public housing debate is about how well the city has attended to the issue
Multiple legal battles have been fought over the Plan for Transformation. For example, the housing authority was sued in 2004 over the resegregation of residents who had received vouchers, much of the litigation focusing on the adequacy of the service system (Popkin, 2010), thus forcing improvements to the service system. Additionally, in 1991, a class of plaintiffs for the Horner developments filed a lawsuit alleging that due to the advanced physical deterioration of the Horner homes, the CHA and HUD had effectively demolished the developments, in violation of the 1937 United States Housing Act. As a result of this, Horner, now called The Villages of West Haven and West Haven Park, is governed by a consent decree that required greater participation of residents in interim decision-making than at other sites in Chicago's Plan. Gebhardt (2009) demonstrates how legal decisions have conveyed power to resident groups from certain developments such as the former Horner site. The redevelopment of Henry Horner Homes, for example, was exceptional because it began with a tenant lawsuit. Horner residents received decision-making authority over the redevelopment when they were granted a legally binding consent decree and the backing of a federal judge. Additionally, according to Alexander (2009), an agreement reached at Henry Horner Homes to designate the area as “revitalizing” on the basis of economic mix rather than racial mix had the effect of changing the focus of the Gautreaux case. As Alex Polikoff found to his chagrin, the case had been "transmuted" into a vehicle for economic rather than racial segregation; he remains "dubious" as to whether income can serve as a proxy for race. Regardless, this decision then created the possibility that other public housing project sites could be designated as “revitalizing.” This included those located in neighborhoods that were much less likely to achieve racial integration in the foreseeable future. The concept of revitalization was "stretched" even further to include potential future revitalization to allow the redevelopment of the Robert Taylor Homes (Alexander, 2009).

Other resident groups at Cabrini-Green and in North Kenwood-Oakland have attempted to use the courts to gain access to the decision-making process, with slightly less success. In 1993 Cabrini-Green developed a revitalization plan that was a part of the original HOPE VI application and required the CHA to sign a Memorandum of Agreement with the Cabrini
Green Local Advisory Council which gave the LAC an explicit right to participate in the redevelopment process. Yet the CHA still prevented the LAC from participating in planning meetings. Consequently, the LAC sued in 1996. After two years of negotiation, the CHA and the LAC settled and a consent decree was created. The decree made the LAC a partner and part owner in the redevelopment. Consequently, the right to hold a legally binding vote on the demolition of some buildings, the right to exclude criminal records for purposes of tenant screening and the ability to approve all development plans "were all won based on the legal actions of the tenants" (Gebhardt, 2009).

According to Sullivan (2003) the process at Cabrini-Green exemplifies how cooperation has the potential to improve the quality of public housing residents’ units and lives. Law professor Lisa Alexander (2009) argues that the contemporary redevelopment processes at Horner and Cabrini demonstrate "that the threat of judicial intervention to enforce their group right to participate in development decision making enabled the residents to develop criteria that made it possible for a greater number of public housing residents to return to the new mixed-income developments and extract other long-term benefits. Thus, traditional public-law measures bolstered the negotiating position of the resident representatives such that they could demand more accountable reforms."

Public Housing Authorities must develop plans for redevelopment in consultation with residents and resident advisory boards in order to receive HUD funding according to Section 18 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. However, Alexander (2009) notes that Authorities can easily comply by establishing resident advisory councils and presenting already formed redevelopment plans to resident representatives. She concludes that, while the measures enable "PHAs to comply, they do not ensure that residents meaningfully participate in revitalization decision making." Indeed, observers have demonstrated that these boards often practically exclude residents.

Many (Gebhardt, 2009; Pattillo, 2008) have shown that it was difficult for public housing residents to "meaningfully participate" in Chicago's reform process. "Notably, this informal network included few, if any, tenant representatives and their meetings were not open to
Residents were rarely respected until they threatened litigation or court intervention. As Alexander argues, "Without a public law framework, HOPE VI as new governance will promote gentrification and displacement, rather than resident empowerment."
SECTION 5. OUTCOMES FOR ORIGINAL PUBLIC HOUSING TENANTS

The impact of the Plan for Transformation on the families who lived in CHA’s developments before the Plan began has been an enduring and contested issue for many researchers (see Bennett et al., 2006; Venkatesh et al., 2004; Popkin and Cunningham, 2005). Popkin notes that the issue of how the Plan for Transformation has affected CHA families "has been controversial since the outset and has remained one of the most contentious aspects the process." Findings from the early stages of relocation predicted that outcomes were generally going to be quite negative. "During this early phase, researchers tracking resident outcomes found that only a small proportion of those referred for services succeeded in moving with vouchers and highlighted many concerns about resident needs" (Popkin, 2010). Yet some research suggests that, at the mid-point of the Plan for Transformation, outcomes appeared to be improving.

There are many positive outcomes for those original residents who have succeeded in moving out of distressed CHA developments. Most live in areas that are lower in poverty than their original CHA developments (Popkin, 2008; Boston, 2009), though the significance of this reduction is debatable. Movers experienced demonstrable improvements in their housing conditions, as well as impressive improvements in perceived neighborhood safety. Overall, the "improvement in movers’ quality of life and overall well-being was substantial" (Popkin, 2010). However, most movers still lived in racially segregated neighborhoods—nearly all of the movers were living in neighborhoods that were more than 90 percent black (Popkin and Cunningham, 2005). Transitioning to the private market included some hardships. Researchers found that many residents had difficulties in making utility payments and residents reported some difficulties integrating socially into their new neighborhoods. Moreover, as of 2009, just 3,843 of the 17,925 original non-senior households had succeeded in moving to the private market with vouchers (Boston 2009; CHA 2009). For the 6,135 10-1-1999 households who remained in family public housing developments as of 2007, the outcomes appear to be less positive. And outcomes for the 7,940 original non-senior
households\(^9\) who began with a Right of Return but who were no longer CHA tenants as of 2007 are substantially unknown (Boston, 2009).

Several studies assess employment, mental health, and educational outcomes for still-active CHA tenants, and also measure the physical distance moved from public housing. Indicative of the importance placed on making gains in these areas, the CHA listed promotion of “self-sufficiency” as one of the Plan for Transformation’s major goals (meaning that families will have income and benefits sufficient to reduce their dependency on public housing and other government subsidies). Findings point to significant differences in outcomes between voucher holders and those who stayed in the original development or temporarily relocated to other public housing (Buron, Levy, and Gallagher, 2007). Most studies find improvements when tenants move out of public housing and either use vouchers or move into mixed-income housing. Some of these findings are in accord with what has generally been discovered about housing redevelopment initiatives nationally.

Beyond employment, the Plan for Transformation has affected residents in many ways, including perceptions of opportunity, changes in mental health (such as feelings of anxiety or depression), and impacts on children. While improvements in self-sufficiency are mixed, generally, the evidence from research shows that one of the largest impacts of moving away from a high poverty neighborhood is a significant improvement in mental health among survey respondents (Popkin, 2006a). Yet additional findings document less positive outcomes such as instances of discrimination, and the special challenges faced by the ‘hard to house’ and by former CHA squatters, and outline the experiences, both positive and negative, of former CHA residents in the new mixed-income developments. The quality of the research itself varies as well. This section will attempt to introduce the findings regarding outcomes for tenants of the CHA and, when possible, relate these to outcomes for residents in redeveloped housing in other cities.

\(^9\) 5,021 of the original (10-1-1999) residents in Senior Developments had terminated their CHA housing assistance as of 2007, the majority due to death and illness (Boston 2009).
Employment

Considered by some to be the prime measure of self-sufficiency, employment gains for Plan for Transformation participants are of considerable interest to housing redevelopment researchers. Some theories suggest that moving may allow residents to live closer to job opportunities or become integrated into job networks (Wilson, 1987) while others attempt to assess whether the cross-class relationships potentially forged in mixed-income communities may connect public housing residents to job opportunities (Joseph, Chaskin and Webber, 2007). The HOPE VI Panel Study, which includes Chicago, included a comparison of changes in employment rate from 2001 to 2005 for public housing residents and voucher holders. The research showed that two years into the Plan for Transformation, in 2001, voucher holders had slightly higher employment rates than public housing residents. Yet as of 2005, neither group demonstrated significant improvements in employment outcomes. At baseline, 48 percent of the working-age respondents were not employed—the same share as at the 2003 and the 2005 follow-up (Buron et al., 2007). Similarly, according to the Metropolitan Planning Council, "the economic status of CHA residents —though better than at the outset of the Plan—continues to be tenuous." The percentage of employed working age residents (not including the 28% of households exempted due to disabilities) remained nearly the same from 1999-2008: 50% of the working age CHA residents were employed in 1999, 52% were employed in 2005, 52% were employed in 2008, and 55% were employed as of March 2010 (CHA 2009; CHA, personal communication, May 25, 2010). Moreover, the Metropolitan Planning Council stressed, these numbers include residents who have “worked for any amount of time during that year.” Among 11,206 heads of households — a subgroup of these employed residents [in 2005] — only 3,026 had worked consistently for the entire year. Of the 11,206 heads of household, about 30 percent are classified as sporadically employed, having worked one to seven quarters in the two year period from 2003-2005 (Chicago Housing Authority et al., 2006).

Boston draft report (2009), however, found that adults who relocated to the private market with vouchers experienced the largest increase in employment rate – 19.9 percentage points – followed by adults who moved into mixed-income housing developments – 6.2 percentage
points. Conversely, adults who remained in public housing developments experienced a slight decrease in employment (-3.5 percentage points).

The NORC research (2007) details the kinds of barriers to employment many residents face, noting that, "the most frequently cited reason for not being employed was that the household member is disabled or has a health problem." Using the Resident Satisfaction Survey data, Rasinski (2007) evaluated female leaseholders that moved as part of Phase III, and also found that the differences in employment rates between the CHA and HCV group were not statistically significant at the baseline survey. While the group of CHA residents who were employed full-time was 6-11 percent lower than that of the housing choice holders, depending on the year, Rasinski identified a third variable--leaseholders’ health status--which accounted for the difference in employment rates for different housing types. As Rasinski noted, "For one reason or another, leaseholders who were in poorer health also were living in CHA housing at the time of the baseline interview." Moreover, health problems were negatively associated with employment, so that regardless of housing type, "the leaseholder’s number of health problems again emerges as an obstacle in securing employment." But it was unclear from the research report whether the differences in employment rates were also not significant at the second follow up survey.

Popkin and Theodos (2008) add additional insight into the difficulties residents face when seeking employment. In an in-depth study using two Chicago public housing research sites they found that tenants' scores averaged at the 6th grade reading level, which they note is too low for many jobs and even GED programs. A 2005 analysis by the Chicago Department of Human Services, too, showed that 44 percent of the residents involved in the Service Connector program did not complete high school, 63 percent showed reading abilities below the 8th grade level, and 84 percent tested below 8th grade levels in math proficiency. Programs designed to help residents find jobs also have not met with much success. Interviews with program administrators indicated that counselors were having problems with the program including difficulties in recruiting residents. Thus, at the end of the first year, just 35 clients had enrolled in Transitional Jobs and only 15 transitioned into unsubsidized employment. The
authors suggest that in order for such programs to be successful they “need to be adjusted for the hard-to-house population” (Popkin and Theodos, 2008, p. 6).

A program designed specifically for the hard to house suggests that special services will be needed for this population to have improved outcomes. Hundreds (or perhaps thousands) of “hard-to-house” families with multiple challenges remain in CHA’s traditional public housing, and struggle to achieve self-sufficiency or even sustain stable housing. Popkin et al. (2008) evaluated The Chicago Family Case Management Demonstration, an initiative designed to meet the challenges of serving the Chicago Housing Authority’s (CHA) “hard-to-house” residents. They found that providing intensive services is much more difficult than many assumed. In future studies researchers will compare the key outcomes after two years for families in the Demonstration to similar families living in other public housing developments, but not offered the Demonstration.

Some studies have found increases in income. The 2009 draft of Boston's study found increases in employment income for all Plan for Transformation participant groups. The average income for all of the still-active ROR residents rose from $8,199 in 1999 to $12,149 in 2007, but Boston did not put these figures into constant dollars, so the income figures overstate the increase. The Chicago Housing Authority et al (2006), too, reported a significant increase (over 50 percent) in the average income of working CHA residents between 1999 and 2006. The average income of working residents has increased from $10,160 per year in 2000 to $15,190 per year in 2005. Yet, in an analysis of this data, the MPC found the increase in income to be deceptive. Because both the percentage of employed working age residents and the salary growth rate between those years have been slight, "it is likely the increase in income levels is the result of a limited number of individuals working more hours or for longer periods of time." Moreover, the consistently employed residents have jobs that are stable, but low-wage and may not be earning wages that can support families (MPC, 2006).

Boston however, using an exact propensity score matching procedure found that, compared to those living in a public housing development, residents who used a voucher or lived in mixed-income community added $1,770 to their household income. Propensity scores controlled for
the head of household's age, tenure, family size, public assistance support status, employment status, gender, a community attributes index, and type of housing assistance received in 2007. In the 2009 draft version of his study Boston concludes, "the families who experienced the greatest gain in self-sufficiency were those who relocated from public housing developments with Housing Choice Vouchers or those who moved from public housing to mixed-income developments" (Boston, 151). Conversely, Boston's study revealed that residents who remained in public housing developments, whether they were rehabilitated or not, experienced the smallest gains in self-sufficiency. However, Joseph (2008) notes that "only working residents are eligible to live in all but one of the new mixed-income developments in Chicago; only heads of household with a disability or who are retired are exempted from this requirement" (p.8) Thus, the increase in income observed for that population could be the result of the policy aspect of the selection process unaccounted for by Boston (2009).

Initiatives designed to aid residents in their employment searches may improve outcomes and offer insight into the processes of securing employment. Opportunity Chicago (OC) is a five-year initiative established in 2006 by The Partnership for New Communities (PNC), in collaboration with the CHA and the Mayor's Office of Workforce Development (MOWD). OC was designed to assist public housing residents in finding and retaining employment, an especially important mission since the Plan for Transformation requires that residents be employed. Early results indicated that the Initiative surpassed its goal for total employment placements in 2007 by placing 1,714 residents in employment. However, most residents who were employed in 2007 did not participate in any of the OC programs or services; rather, they were placed by Service Connector contractors directly or found employment on their own. For those 842 residents enrolled in at least one program in the Initiative in 2007, 34 percent were placed in employment. The significance of this statistic is difficult to interpret because of quality issues associated with resident-level data, possibly because the data spanned both Service Connector and the Family Works program. These created significant challenges for the evaluation, since researchers were unable to present a profile of residents who accessed the initiative, and/or to make evaluative statements about the quality of employment placements made through the Initiative. High rates of missing data and incomplete intake data eliminated many variables that would have provided further detail on the experience of residents who have
participated in the program (Parkes et al., 2009). However, the FamilyWorks program focuses on tracking outcomes, and with aid of outside researchers, the CHA has expanded the type of data collected and made data entry mandatory for providers (CHA personal communication, 25 May 2010).

**Health Outcomes**

Buron et al. (2007) report data from national HOPE VI Panel Study where respondents were asked about their mental health in the previous year and within the previous month. Voucher holders surveyed in 2001 and 2005 showed a statistically significant decrease (from 30 to 21 percent) in anxiety episodes over the previous 12 months. Results from Chicago-specific research show positive results as well. Popkin reported that the CHA Relocation Counseling Assessment study in Chicago "showed an almost immediate impact on mental health for relocatees" (Popkin (2006a). In their in-depth study of two Chicago developments, Chaskin and Joseph (2010) note reports of improved psychological well-being, writing that "a high proportion of former public housing residents described what could be called psychological benefits from their move," such as "feelings of decreased stress and increased 'peace of mind' in the new environment."

Beyond mental health, households' self-reports of general wellbeing indicate improvements for movers. NORC (2007) examined differences in a set of still-active Right of Return residents’ perceptions of opportunities, separated into two groups according to their current housing status: whether the leaseholder was currently living in CHA public housing or in a private apartment with a Housing Choice Voucher. The results of the analyses showed that significantly more leaseholders that lived in private units with an HCV felt that their life opportunities were better since they had moved, compared to those who were still living in public housing. Additionally, significantly more of the residents who had settled into their private market apartments felt that their move would benefit themselves and their family compared to leaseholders who chose to remain in CHA housing (NORC, 2007).
Other research on the Plan for Transformation details more ambiguous mental health findings, especially with respect to the more vulnerable CHA residents. In their interviews with 344 residents living in two CHA developments—Wells/Madden Park and Dearborn Homes, Popkin and Theodos (2008) documented tenants with "severe depression and uncontrolled schizophrenia; many—perhaps most—had experienced trauma and had symptoms of PTSD." They thus identify a need for increased focus on mental health. Focusing on the transition to mixed-income developments, Joseph’s (2008) findings suggest that poor physical and mental health may be a key barrier preventing many CHA residents from moving to a mixed-income development.

Underscoring Rasinski’s findings about the relationship between health and employment, The Resident Satisfaction Survey also documented high rates of poor health, including hypertension and vision problems (National Opinion Research Center, 2007). Popkin (2010), too, found that residents were in very poor health. Not only was poor health a major issue for HOPE VI Panel Study respondents from all sites at the baseline in 2001 (Popkin et al. 2002), but 2005 findings showed that residents' health worsened over time: in 2005, two out of every five respondents (41 percent) in Chicago reported that their health was in either “fair” or “poor” condition. Popkin (2008) compared CHA respondents to adults in general and to other black women (the latter group has higher-than-average rates of poor health) and found that at every age level, respondents were much more likely to describe their health as fair or poor than were other adults and black women. Respondents were more likely to be obese and reported being diagnosed with serious medical conditions (arthritis, asthma, depression, diabetes, hypertension, and stroke) at two times the rate for black women nationally. "Not only did respondents report high rates of disease, they were also clearly very debilitated by their illnesses: one in four respondents reported having such difficulty with physical mobility that they could not walk three city blocks, climb 10 steps without resting, or stand on their feet for two hours " (Manjarrez, Popkin, and Guernsey, 2007). Residents remaining in CHA units were in poorer health than those who had moved to the private market using vouchers.

Popkin also links health status with employment: "These health barriers have major implications for respondents’ overall well-being, impeding their ability to get—or keep—a
job." Health problems were by far the biggest barrier to employment: among working-age respondents, nearly a third (32 percent) reported poor health, and most of them (62 percent) were unemployed. The strongest predictor of not working was having severe challenges with physical mobility. Depression also substantially reduced the probability of being employed, as did having been diagnosed with asthma. Other factors that affected employment included: not having a high school diploma, having children under age 6, and having problems with adequate child care (Levy and Woolley, 2007; Popkin, 2010).

**Personal Safety**

With respect to improvements to personal safety, the research generally shows a positive change due to housing relocation. Popkin finds the dramatic changes in neighborhood safety for voucher movers "more striking than the improvements in neighborhood poverty rates" (Popkin, 2010). For example, Buron et al. (2007) report that the Panel Study showed that "most residents—whether voucher holders or residents in other public housing developments—felt safer and reported fewer problems with criminal activity after moving from their original public housing development." Moreover, voucher holders reported significantly larger improvements compared to those who relocated to other public housing. As Popkin (2006) summarizes, there are "important benefits for those residents who received vouchers and moved to housing in the private market. These movers were living in dramatically safer neighborhoods. Movers reported much lower levels of problems with drug trafficking and violent crime than they did when they lived in their original public housing developments" (Popkin, 2006a, 155).

The trend for Chicago movers followed that of the other sites in the HOPE VI Panel Study: voucher movers consistently reported that their new neighborhoods were far safer than their original developments (Popkin and Cove, 2007). For example, in the Panel Study at the baseline in 2001, nearly 90 percent of Madden/Wells respondents reported “big problems” with drug sales and drug use in their development. By 2005, just 18 percent of voucher movers reported similar problems in their new neighborhoods. Likewise, prior to their moves, 70 percent of the respondents reported “big problems” with shootings and violence; at the follow
up in 2005, only 13 percent of movers reported "big problems" with shootings and violence in their new communities (Popkin, 2010).

Respondents from the NORC (2007) survey were asked to compare the safety of the neighborhood where they lived before they relocated to their current neighborhood. Slightly more than half of leaseholders felt that their new neighborhood was more safe (51%), 13% felt that it was less safe, and just over a third felt that it was about the same. In fact, Ernst (2007) found that "HCV/CHA was the only variable that seemed to be a consistent predictor of neighborhood safety. Residents living in HCV moved to safer neighborhoods than residents living in CHA [properties]. This was true even when crime was measured per inhabitant indicating that HCV leaseholders were not simply moving to less dense neighborhoods. Rather, they moved to neighborhoods that were different in a more meaningful way" (p. 51).

Yet safety remained an issue for a considerable percentage of residents. Venkatesh's research found that, "Safety is still a major concern for residents in the public housing system regardless of their housing choices. 39% of the families report some kind of concern with crime and gang activities in their new neighborhoods" (Venkatesh, 2004).

However, there is less research on the safety within the redeveloped mixed-income sites and little accounting of the safety levels currently found in the rehabilitated public housing developments into which some CHA residents moved.

**Outcomes for Children**

When evaluating improvements in outcomes for children, including educational outcomes, safety and behavior, researchers report mixed results. In assessing educational outcomes from the nation-wide HOPE VI Panel Study, Gallagher and Bajaj (2007) found school engagement (an assessment of the child’s interest in and willingness to do schoolwork) did not improve for children in families who held vouchers. Looking specifically at the Chicago case, most researchers found similar results to national trends. Jacob (2003), using administrative data from the CHA and the Chicago Public Schools, found that moving due to the demolition of
public housing buildings had no impact on the academic achievement of younger children on a variety of outcome measures. These included test scores, grades and retention. He further found that, "even those students who did move to substantially better neighborhoods did not end up in significantly better schools." He reported that while children affected by the closures were considerably less likely to be living in high-rise public housing in subsequent years, they were still living in high poverty neighborhoods and attending schools identical to those of the control group students. Moreover, even when students did move to substantially better neighborhoods, they did not end up in significantly better schools (Jacob, 2003, 4). Jacob concludes that, "while students impacted by the closures did not move far from their original neighborhoods, they were considerably less likely to live in public housing following the closures. Yet these students had no better educational achievement and attainment than comparable peers who were living in buildings not directly impacted by the closures and were thus more likely to continue living in public housing."

Moreover, the 2009 draft of Boston’s study reported negative findings about the quality of the elementary schools serving both the mixed-income neighborhoods as well as the neighborhoods where vouchers were used. He found that, compared to the original public housing neighborhoods, on average neighborhoods where vouchers were used had a lower quality of elementary schools that served the attendance zone. Similarly, the neighborhoods serving families who relocated to a mixed-income community also had lower quality elementary schools serving the attendance zones, compared to the quality of elementary schools that served families in 1999.

Other research suggests that, even as some families move, some continued to send their children to school in their original neighborhood. In their in-depth work with residents of the former Robert Taylor Homes, Venkatesh and Celimni (2004) found that up to four years after relocation about "one quarter of families continue to enroll their children in schools near the Robert Taylor Homes, even after moving several miles away." Moreover, "Family heads who keep their children in schools near RTH speak of trusting relationships with teachers. Commuting back to the old neighborhood, however, proves to be a difficult task because of time and energy that must be expended. Those families who enroll their children in schools
around the RTH report difficulty paying for transportation—families often were unaware of free transportation services available—and they must travel several miles each morning and afternoon. Given their inability to afford public transportation, parents suggest that they sometimes keep children at home or send the children to live with relatives in the school catchment area.

The NORC (2007) survey included several questions regarding school satisfaction, though none about educational outcomes. In general, resident responses showed little improvement in satisfaction. For example, when asked whether they were more satisfied with the current school, less satisfied with the current school, or about as satisfied with the current school as with the previous school, slightly less than half (n=58 of 135) of leaseholders indicated that they were more satisfied with their child's current school than with their former school. The report does not separate the responses for movers and non-movers, making it difficult to determine differences between these groups.

In assessing children's behavioral outcomes from the nationwide HOPE VI Panel Study, Gallagher and Bajaj (2007) found some improvement in children's behavior across the five panel sites. Parents of children in families who relocated using vouchers reported lower rates of behavior problems in 2005 compared with their children's behavior before relocation in 2001. Children in voucher households also showed improvement relative to children who relocated to other public housing. In 2005, children in voucher households were slightly less likely to exhibit two or more delinquent behaviors (3 versus 12 percent). They were also considerably more likely than children in other public housing to exhibit five out of six positive behaviors (62 versus 43 percent).

Research indicates that residents also felt that their children were safer after the Plan for Transformation was implemented. The NORC survey included questions about respondents' sense of their children's safety in their neighborhood of residence. Most respondents indicated that their children had safe places nearby to play outside. However, respondents using Housing Choice Vouchers more often reported that their children had safe places to play outside than respondents with children in public housing (80% vs. 69%). This difference passed
tests of statistical significance, even though the figures for perceived safety in other public housing was also "surprisingly high" (NORC, 2007).

Yet the authors report that children in voucher households may not yet have fully adjusted to their new neighborhoods. In in-depth interviews, interviewers asked children directly about their new neighborhoods and friendships relative to their old neighborhoods and friends. Reportedly, while many children said that they had made new friends in their new neighborhoods, many others also indicated that they did not have close friends in these new neighborhood settings. Thus, this social adjustment period, while isolating for children, "may also be protective… Time spent alone or with family may protect youth from the negative influences of peers in their new neighborhood and original development" (Gallagher and Bajaj, 2007, 4).

Moreover, though relocation positively impacted the living environments of children from voucher households, the demolition and revitalization activities in the original developments appear to have negatively impacted the lives of children whose parents have not relocated and who remain in place, as well as other children who are adjusting to living in different public housing developments. Popkin (2008), reporting results from the Panel Study, finds that those still living in their original development—most of them from Madden/Wells—are experiencing the most problems. This is especially true in the areas of delinquent behaviors. Popkin (2008) found the trends for delinquent behavior for the children still living in traditional public housing "especially disturbing." While the incidence of delinquent behaviors did not change for youth in the voucher households, it increased for youth still in their original development (by 12 percentage points) and youth in other public housing (by 10 percentage points) (Gallagher and Levy, 2006). Perhaps most dramatically, the incidence of delinquent behaviors for girls still living in their original development "skyrocketed" (by 24 percentage points between 2001-2005). Popkin concludes that, "This finding suggests that girls, in particular, are suffering from the ill effects of being left behind in communities that are becoming increasingly dangerous and chaotic as vacancies increase" (Popkin, 2010).
Researchers from NORC found that many interview respondents in the original developments report the loss of neighbors and the rise of vacant units. "This dramatic increase in reported problems for girls who still live in the original development suggests something particularly destructive about that environment—an increase in gang activity, violent crime, or social disorder—may be driving them to become involved in delinquent behavior" (Gallagher and Bajaj, 2007).

Despite these outcomes, other studies show that subsidized residents in mixed-income communities expressed optimism that the transformation would lead to improvements in local schools. As Levy and Gallagher (2006) report, "Participants talked about the benefits that their children might realize from the promised educational improvements. There was hope that as higher income and/or white families moved to the area, the schools would have to improve to attract and keep new students." Pattillo (2007) holds that original poor public housing residents will also likely not be the ultimate long-term primary beneficiaries of current educational reform initiatives in redeveloped mixed-income neighborhoods. Yet as noted earlier, according to Boston, the quality of the elementary schools actually declined for residents who moved to mixed-income developments as of 2007.

**Social Networks**

Other outcomes of interest for researchers include changes to residents' social networks, both in terms of maintaining old social ties and making new ones. These findings, too, were mixed. Little work has been done looking at changes in residents' social ties across cities with substantial public housing redevelopment. Foster (2006) notes that in general, residents who move out of public housing and into neighborhoods with private rental housing do forge relationships with their new neighbors. She reports that "Studies suggest that in fact some low income city residents who move to predominantly white, economically stable suburbs are able to integrate into existing social networks and acquire new social norms, competencies, and resources in doing so." However, as Venkatesh notes, "public housing families live in highly dense social networks that are disproportionately comprised of other CHA residents" and relocation will likely weaken these. Popkin (2006) concludes that HOPE VI relocation studies
show that, in general, redevelopment negatively impacts residents' existing social networks: "There are real costs in terms of loss of important social ties and support networks." Yet many agree this disparity might lessen over time as HOPE VI relocatees become more established in their new neighborhoods (Gallagher and Bajaj, 2007).

Many residents of public housing have extensive and enduring social networks built after many years of tenancy. In their sample of residents, Popkin, Cunningham and Woodley (2003) found that about three-quarters of the tenants had lived in the neighborhood for more than a decade and thus had established many long-standing social ties in the neighborhood. Venkatesh and Celimni (2004) detail how instrumental social networks are for residents affected by the Plan for Transformation. "They rely on other public housing residents for information, money, services, and emotional/psychological support. The majority of families expressed a desire to remain close to their existing friends and kin, with whom they had developed arrangements to exchange resources and support one another" (Venkatesh and Celimli, 2004). They also found that seventy-six percent of a tenant’s social network is composed of other public housing inhabitants. Not surprisingly then, families often go back to their original communities to seek financial and social support. Not only have residents developed many ties within the development, they have a difficult time making ties outside their place of residence. Venkatesh (2002) concludes, "Thus, public housing is the primary source of social support for these CHA residents…Many have not developed wide-ranging social ties outside of public housing, and they report difficulties establishing new relations with neighbors, city agencies, and local organizations in their new settlement areas."

The NORC survey asked residents about sources of social support, such as the frequency of giving and receiving help from friends, neighbors and relatives. The survey showed that interactions involving help and advice took place most often with family outside the neighborhood, old friends in the neighborhood, and “someone else.” Among neighbors, leaseholders most often reported having only casual visits with neighbors and giving or getting rides (NORC, 2007). Moreover, Rasinski (2007) "failed to find effects of neighborhood social capital on employment."
Joseph (2008) contrasted the current casual relationships with neighbors experienced by relocatees in mixed-income developments with the more intense relationships they had with neighbors in their original housing: "Other former public housing residents also described their social ties at their previous development and described elements of that community that they missed such as knowing everyone in the development and having people to watch their kids and from whom they could borrow items" (p.241).

Studies focused specifically on changes to social ties of residents relocated through the Plan for Transformation have uncovered the nuanced social relations among public housing residents. Additionally, "Their informal social networks shape public housing tenants’ familiarity with non-‘opportunity’ areas." As Venkatesh details, "A small percentage of households moved before mid-July, 2003. These so-called ‘first movers’ “… exert an enormous influence over other relocating families because CHA families live in peer and kin networks disproportionately comprised of other public housing families. Families in the buildings rely on the ‘first movers’ to a greater extent than other sources of information about potential neighborhoods, available housing, and so on. The ‘first movers’ also are examples of successful relocation, thus other families look to their experiences when trying to move" (Venkatesh and Celimli, 2004).

Results from the NORC study (2007) shows a general loss of familiarity with neighbors for movers compared to non-movers and a comparison group: "If leaseholders who moved are considered separately from those who had not moved, however, differences emerge. As opposed to a comparison group, non-movers reported more often that it was ‘very easy’ or ‘somewhat easy’ to pick out outsiders. In addition, when comparing movers and non-movers, those who had moved reported significantly greater difficulty picking out outsiders" (p.43). Additionally, 24% of movers had 3 or more friends in the neighborhood while 53% of non-movers did, a statistically significant difference. But, perhaps most surprisingly, 66% of the comparison sample\(^\text{10}\) had 3 or more friends in the neighborhood, a statistically significant

\(^\text{10}\) The comparison sample were respondents to the Community Survey of the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN). The PHDCN is a longitudinal study aimed at understanding the development of children growing up in urban neighborhoods, what factors lead to juvenile delinquency, adult criminal behavior, drug abuse and violence. The Community Survey asked Chicago residents from 343 neighborhood
difference compared to both the movers and non-movers. This demonstrates how socially isolated subsidized households are, regardless of their relocation status.

**Cross-Class Interaction**

The frequency of cross-class interaction is another social variable of persistent interest to some researchers. No national level study appears to have been conducted and most findings in terms of cross-class interaction in Plan for Transformation developments are limited to a series of studies done by Joseph and Chaskin who conducted in-depth, mainly qualitative research at three former Chicago public housing sites. Generally, they found low levels of social interaction. "The general lack of social interaction was noted by respondents across income levels. Although several described their new neighbors as friendly…residents largely expressed dissatisfaction with the ‘sense of community’ at the new development" (Joseph, 2008).

Joseph (2010) report further that, although respondents discussed the benefits of observing one another’s lives from a distance, they found very few instances of interactions that led to specific, instrumental benefits, such as access to resources or new opportunities.

Additionally, results from Joseph's (2008) work also indicate that subsidized residents who have moved into mixed-income settings are not always interested in developing social ties. "Many of the former public housing residents told us that they did not plan to try to get to know their neighbors. In order to maintain a low profile in the development, and perhaps avoid the possibility of drawing attention to themselves and jeopardizing their residence there, many said that they would keep to themselves and mind their own business." The residents also had few expectations of other benefits, such as job referrals or other exchanges of social capital from their higher income neighbors. Conversely, the middle-income residents reported being interested in making social connections. While research such as Chaskin and Joseph's explores residents' social experiences in new mixed-income development, there are still benefits outside of social interaction that residents accrued due to living in mixed-income housing. In some cases these include higher quality construction (Popkin 2006a) as well as quality of life clusters throughout the city to assess their neighborhoods on a variety of dimensions.
benefits for lower income residents such as access to higher quality services and greater informal social control in the neighborhood (Joseph, Chaskin, and Webber, 2007).

Comparatively few of the former public housing residents to date actually live in newly revitalized mixed-income housing developments, either in Chicago or in many other HOPE VI developments nationwide. In the multi-city Panel Study researchers found that for families with children, the numbers living in redeveloped HOPE VI units was quite small. Just 5% of families with children lived in a HOPE VI mixed-income site (Gallagher and Bajaj, 2007). Looking across cities, Popkin (2005) notes, "Relatively few original residents have returned to the revitalized sites, though many HOPE VI sites are only partially reoccupied, so the number of original residents who will ultimately return to the revitalized sites is unknown." HUD figures for 240 HOPE VI grantees suggest that, as of September 30, 2008, 24 percent of relocated households have returned to occupy apartments in completed HOPE VI development, although this reoccupancy figure does not separate out families from seniors (Cisneros and Engdahl, 2009, 302).

In Chicago, some consider this low return rate to reveal a general disinterest in serving the original residents, and treat such exclusion as evidence that the Plan for Transformation has failed (Wilten and Nayak, 2006). Others examining the Chicago context find similarly low numbers of former public housing residents returning to redeveloped mixed-income sites, but offer different explanations for this outcome. Boston’s deployment of CHA data reveals that, as of 2007, only 1035 of the original 26,199 households lived in mixed-income developments and only 551 of these households were families (as opposed to seniors). However, CHA reports that more than 2,100 10-1-99 households had been housed in mixed-housing sites as of the first quarter of 2010, and that nearly all of them are classified as families (CHA, personal communication, May 25, 2010). Still, as Joseph (2010) notes, "One of the most unexpected developments of the Transformation is how many public housing residents have decided not to return to the new developments." The work suggests that people are not accepting the housing for two reasons, one positive the other more difficult to assess: First, people have established themselves in their new neighborhood and second, the lease terms exclude many residents, calling into question just how much “choice” they have really exercised in deciding not to seek
entry into the mixed-income developments. Levy and Gallagher (2006) provide detail supporting the latter explanation, reporting that in their case study sites, the revised employment requirement for residency\textsuperscript{11} is a barrier to leasing units in the new mixed-income developments to current and former public housing residents who formerly lived on site. While many may not qualify due to the employment criterion, many more may not qualify due to multiple problems with lease compliance. Joseph (2008) adds that "Clearly relevant for housing and social policy is the fact that a mixed-income development "is not an option" for the ‘hard to house,’ those facing multiple challenges with physical and mental health, lack of employability, and other familial difficulties" (p. 252). Yet the supply of qualified public housing households that can move into mixed-income housing is also limited. Presumably this also helps to explain why so many of the low-income households entering into the CHA’s mixed-income developments have apparently not been drawn from the thousands of ‘Right of Return’ families left from 1999.

The NORC findings also indicate that former residents may not be interested in returning to mixed-income housing, though this may be the result of misperceptions about the conditions of the redeveloped housing. The NORC (2003) Resident Relocation Survey asked leaseholders to recall whether they had stated a preference for a newly rehabilitated unit in public housing, a Section 8/HCV or an unsubsidized living situation. Most respondents said their choice had been to relocate using a Section 8/HCV rather than remain in public housing. Thus residents may not be distinguishing between housing that is being redeveloped for mixed-income housing tenancy and public housing that will remain entirely low income. As Boston notes, "even though many have an opportunity to return to a mixed-income community, most residents still prefer vouchers" (Boston, 2009). Joseph (2010) in interviewing developers found that they were concerned that though there could be nearly 8,000 subsidized units in mixed-income housing eventually made available for public housing eligible residents, it has become "more apparent that fewer eligible residents are interested in returning than expected." The

\[\text{In 2008, the Chicago Housing Authority announced it would be instituting a work requirement for all residents, not just those in the new, mixed-income housing, as had previously been the case. The policy, which went into effect January 1, 2009, mandates that all adults ages 18-61 living in traditional public housing developments be employed or engaged in activities that will lead to work, for at least 15 hours per week, initially, rising to 20 hours/week.}\]
developers suggested that other public housing eligible residents, such as the 51,000 households currently on the CHA waiting list, might be considered (Olivo, 2005).

While some note low numbers of residents either able or interested in returning to mixed-income developments, others note that there simply aren't many units available to subsidized residents in mixed-income communities anyway. As Joseph notes, "there will be almost 8,000 units available for public housing residents in the new mixed-income developments." Yet since there were nearly 18,000 households at the start of the Plan Transformation who had been living in family public housing (as opposed to living in public housing for seniors), this means that most of the remaining households will live in other situations, including rehabbed CHA family developments (i.e., 100 percent public housing units), scattered-site housing, and Housing Choice Vouchers in the private market. This is as framers of the Plan intended the outcomes to be.

**Financial Challenges**

Results from the Panel Study suggest that Chicago voucher holders, like voucher holders in other cities, have been experiencing financial difficulties (Buron, Levy, and Gallagher, 2007). Popkin attributes many of these difficulties to the transition from public to private market housing, where residents must adjust to the norms of the private rental market. Residents report that, unlike public housing property managers, private market property managers demand on-time rent payments. Consequently, Chicago voucher holders were significantly less likely than those still in public housing to report paying their rent late (Popkin, 2010). However, the CHA Panel Study findings suggest that this may be because "when faced with the trade-offs, most voucher holders in Chicago, like those from the other sites, chose to pay their rent on time to avoid risking their housing" (Popkin, 2010). Those trade-offs included cutting back on utility payments and food.

Utility payments present another challenge. Since utilities were included in public housing rents, residents struggled when obligated to pay this added expense, a challenge made all the more difficult by the seasonal variation in utility costs. Consequently, not only were HCV
residents significantly more likely to report difficulties with paying utilities than public housing residents, they also reported having difficulty paying for food for their families. About a third of voucher holders in the Chicago sample of residents from the Panel Study reported trouble paying their utility bills, compared with just 5 percent of residents who were still living in public housing (Popkin, 2008). Similarly, the Resident Satisfaction Survey residents showed that voucher holders were more likely to report having their gas or electricity turned off than those still living in public housing (National Opinion Research Center, 2007).

Voucher holders in the Chicago Panel Study (63 percent) were also more likely than public housing households (52 percent) to report financial hardships paying for food (Popkin, 2008). Sullivan (2003) found that the financial pressures of living in the private rental market may also be impacting residents' location choices in the private market. As noted earlier, residents who select Housing Choice Vouchers but have no income are provided with a stipend with which to pay the monthly utility bills.

**The "Hard to House"

Research on the Plan for Transformation has highlighted the striking numbers of residents with multiple barriers to self-sufficiency. Popkin labels these residents the "Hard to House" and, while such residents are found in any public housing system, the numbers are especially high and the needs especially acute for Chicago Housing Authority residents. According to Popkin (2006a), these hard to house families "are not experiencing the benefits of the CHA’s transformation. These vulnerable families have been relying on public housing as the housing of last resort and are very similar to homeless families; indeed, the major difference between the two groups is that hard to house public housing residents have had a stable place to live. Hard to house public housing residents include families with multiple barriers—long-term public housing residence (10 years or more), weak employment histories, low levels of education, substance abuse, criminal records, domestic violence, and mental health problems; very large families; elderly and disabled households who need special accommodations; ‘grandfamilies,’ i.e., grandparents who are the primary caregivers for children; and those with
members with ‘one-strike problems,’ i.e., drug or felony arrests or convictions, that may bar the entire family from assisted housing.” Across the five HOPE VI Panel Study sites, “hard-to-house” residents were more likely to end up in traditional public housing and thus did not realize the safety benefit that accompanied a move to private market units that improved the quality of life for voucher movers. Popkin also argues that this population is at risk of losing their housing for reasons that go beyond affordability. Popkin found that the percentage of hard-to-house households in the five sites ranged from 37 percent (Shore Park in Atlantic City, NJ) to 62 percent (in both Chicago's Ida B. Wells complex and the East Capitol Hill development in Washington D.C.).

Popkin and Cunningham (2003) in their in-depth study of two CHA developments, Madden and Wells, found that a large percentage of residents have an array of special housing needs. "About 40 percent of Wells households report someone in the household with a disability and nearly 45 percent are large families—34 percent need four-bedroom units. Finally, 16 percent are elderly (older than 65), and our census indicates that 42 households are custodial grandparents.” Specifically in the Plan for Transformation context, Cunningham and Sawyer (2005) found that "Vulnerable households, and large families are less likely to move to opportunity neighborhoods." Indeed, because Chicago has such a large population of such needy residents (Popkin, Cunningham and Burt, 2005), this issue is one of the most serious threats to the overall success of the Plan for Transformation.

**Squatters**

Along with the official residents who can be classified as hard to house, an additional population will be difficult to serve in the Plan for Transformation. Unknown numbers of residents lived off-lease in CHA buildings pre-transformation, and this group seems to be largely excluded from consideration as part of the Plan. While squatters are not legally entitled to relocation services, Popkin, Cunningham and Woodley (2003) advocated for the CHA and the city to “set aside some of the millions of dollars slated for mixed-income developments to create a significant number of transitional units so that as the buildings come down, there will be a compassionate and effective plan for the squatters who, over the years, have become CHA
residents." (Popkin, Cunningham and Woodley, 2003). Some squatters lived off-lease with CHA leaseholders in CHA apartment units; other squatters lived in the hallways and in vacant units. In their census of the Ida B. Wells population, Popkin, Cunningham and Woodley (2003) found that nearly one-quarter of the squatters living in Wells were children (they counted 294 adults and 94 children). These residents, too, were affected by the Plan for Transformation and yet because they have no ‘relocation rights’ and do not qualify for social services, researchers argue that they are especially vulnerable to being negatively impacted by the Plan (Popkin, 2005). Venketesh and Celimli found that "Squatters comprise a significant percentage of the public housing population." The squatters often suffer from problems with drug and alcohol addiction, low work experience and high rates of involvement in criminal activity. The squatter population included older men (35+ years), younger men (20+ years) and single mothers with children. Their research sought to document the experiences of squatters after they left public housing in order to document their experiences following the destruction of the Robert Taylor Homes.

Finally, both Venkatesh’s Robert Taylor study and another study by Urban Institute researchers (Popkin, Cunningham and Woodley, 2003) highlighted the problem of the hundreds of squatters who had been relying on CHA’s poorly-managed developments as de facto homeless shelters. The Robert Taylor study found that that most of these squatters were connected to other CHA families; after their buildings closed, about half experienced homelessness. Most ultimately moved into another CHA building where there were other squatters. The “Residents at Risk Study” conducted a census of squatters living in the Ida Wells/Madden Park homes in 2002, and found adults and children living the developments’ vacant apartments, stairwells, and laundry rooms. Like the squatters in the Robert Taylor study, most of these illegal residents had once been legal tenants. According to Popkin (2010), the presence of such a large population of off-lease residents compounds the challenges facing the CHA as it proceeds with the Plan because these residents require some resources even though none are budgeted for them. Moreover, the Plan is impacting squatters in unknown ways because they are not tracked but will lose their housing, which for squatters is clearly housing of last resort. This presents a significant dilemma for the CHA, since the Authority wishes to distance itself from its former role as default provider of last-resort housing.
SECTION 6: HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOOD QUALITY OUTCOMES

Some research reports on the quality of the places produced and experienced during the Plan. The research encompasses both former project sites and sites where CHA residents relocated as the Plan was implemented. These inquiries investigate safety and security, the quality of the housing, and the poverty level and racial make-up of these communities. As noted earlier, this involved three basic changes in settings for the original CHA residents: some moved from their original unit into the private market using vouchers, others moved out of their original unit and into another public housing unit, and another set moved out of their original unit and into mixed-income housing.

According to Boston’s draft report (2009), each of these changes represented a net improvement in living environments for the original CHA residents. He details that, by 2007, "families had moved to better neighborhoods and received very different types of housing assistance. For example, 7.4% lived in mixed-income housing where only .1% lived in this type of housing in 1999." Similarly, in 2007, 31.6% lived in family developments – this is down from 58.8% in 1999; 12.6% lived in scattered site housing – which is a slight increase over the 9.5% that lived in scattered site housing in 1999; and 24.5% used Housing Choice Vouchers whereas no residents used vouchers in 1999 (not including the tens of thousands of voucher holders that were not part of the Plan for Transformation). There has also been a distinct shift in the kinds of housing the CHA is managing, given that the CHA is reducing the number of family housing units while maintaining the same number of senior housing units. In 1999, 9,480 of the 38,776 original units the CHA had under management (which includes unoccupied units) were senior housing units. Just over 8,000 of these senior units were occupied. However, while nearly all of the senior units CHA had under management are to be retained under the Plan for Transformation (9,382 out of an original 9,480), ultimately the CHA will operate about 13,000 fewer total units. Thus, while 24.4% of the pre-Plan for Transformation CHA units were intended for seniors, post Plan for Transformation 37.5% of the units will be reserved for seniors.
Neighborhood and Housing Quality for CHA Residents

One of the primary motivations for public housing redevelopment both in Chicago (and nationally) has been to rehabilitate the dilapidated building stock and to provide clients with a greater variety of quality housing options (Boston, 2009). As the CHA (2009a) has stated, the Plan for Transformation seeks to, "Renew the physical structure of the CHA properties." Redevelopment is intended to make clean, well-constructed, well-maintained residential units accessible to families from public housing. With physical redevelopment well underway Popkin observes, "The changes that the CHA’s transformation of its distressed public housing has wrought over the past nine years have been dramatic and have changed the city’s landscape markedly. Most striking is the absence of the massive high-rises that dominated the landscape in some of the city’s poorest neighborhoods for half a century. The neighborhoods where these developments once stood are also changing rapidly" (Popkin, 2010). Many of the areas where high-rise public housing once stood now have new and rehabilitated buildings, some with high-end condominiums and rentals. There are also refurbished parks and new schools (Levy and Gallagher, 2006). Much research investigates the neighborhood and housing quality where CHA families live, whether they live in redeveloped mixed-income and rehabilitated family housing in the original public housing stock, or have moved into the private market using vouchers. Housing quality encompasses the physical condition of residents' actual housing unit, building and development. Most often, the broader measure of “neighborhood quality” takes into account the level of crime and disorder in the neighborhoods. Boston’s draft version of a Community Attributes Index (2009) attempted to create a more holistic measure of neighborhood quality to help calibrate the meaning of moves out of CHA developments. It is hoped that this mechanism can be more fully developed in the final version of his report, and linked to the efforts of others who have tried to produce holistic indices that measure not just poverty levels and other easily quantifiable variables, but can also begin to capture the ‘use value’ that neighborhoods deliver for their residents.
Research suggests that neighborhood quality has improved for the occupants of redeveloped mixed-income communities. As Popkin (2006a) notes, the neighborhoods where the redeveloped housing developments are located have benefited from lower levels of crime and disorder, "and the public housing system is benefiting from new infusions of public and private funding.” There have also been improvements in housing quality but also some disappointments. Joseph and Chaskin (2009) find that, "The most concrete and immediate change that the mixed-income strategy can provide for those moving from public housing is an improvement in the quality of their residential units, buildings and immediate physical environment. Although this same benefit might be achieved through other options that were available to them, such as moving into a rehabbed development or a lower-poverty neighborhood, this was clearly an important perceived benefit of living in a new mixed-income development among most of the former public housing residents with whom we spoke” (p.17). Yet Joseph and Chaskin also point out that because so few 10-1-1999 residents reside in mixed-income housing, the beneficiaries of physical renewal were often not the original CHA residents but the new middle class households. Moreover, because many mixed-income developments were located in gentrifying neighborhoods, Joseph and Chaskin observe that, "every owner and renter of market-rate units in our sample mentioned location as a benefit [to their enjoyment of the apartment]." By contrast, the former public housing residents infrequently mentioned location as a benefit.

Surprisingly, there were some problems with housing quality in redeveloped housing. Some residents complained about thin walls and generally shoddy construction (Joseph and Chaskin, 2009). As the authors note, construction issues such as these are, "directly relevant to shaping broader dynamics in the mixed-income environment because it exacerbates tensions where there are lifestyle differences—like hours of activity versus quiet time, type of music and appropriate volume level, or the conduct of children and visitors" (Joseph, 2009).

The Quality of Non-Redeveloped Housing

Other research considers the residents who remained in non-redeveloped public housing, i.e., residents who had not yet moved from their original housing and were awaiting placement
into either mixed-income housing, the private market or rehabilitated public housing. This group also included residents who could not move out of public housing and whose only option was placement in a yet-to-be rehabilitated family public housing development. For residents who remained in public housing, neighborhood quality did not improve and in some cases worsened. In the NORC (2007) survey, non-movers reported that drinking in public and selling or using drugs constituted a “big problem” or “somewhat of a problem” more often than did the comparison sample used; litter and graffiti were cited less often as a problem.

Results from the Chicago sample in the HOPE VI Panel Study showed that for the 41 percent of Madden/Wells respondents still living in their original units in 2005, their living conditions that were just as bad as at baseline in 2001. Popkin surmises that, "indeed, it is possible conditions were even worse as vacancy rates had increased and physical conditions deteriorated." This happened in part because those residents who did not have problems that kept them from qualifying for a voucher or new mixed-income housing were easier to relocate and had moved out. This left behind a concentration of troubled households. In in-depth interviews, respondents described greater problems with disorder after 2001. These problems included squatters sleeping in vacant units and hallways, broken locks and lights left in disrepair and trash collecting in hallways and stairwells (Popkin, 2010).

**The Neighborhood and Housing Quality in the Private Market**

Neighborhood and housing quality for those who moved into the private market using vouchers has led to more positive results, though again not uniformly so. Nationwide studies suggest "Important benefits for those residents who received vouchers and moved to housing in the private market" (Popkin, 2006). Results from Plan for Transformation centered studies suggest similar positive results for Chicago for both housing and neighborhood quality. The benefits include substantially better living conditions in higher quality housing. Movers were also much less likely to report problems with their housing such as broken plumbing, mold, and peeling paint, all of which pose significant health threats (Popkin, 2006). For example, the proportion of Madden/Wells voucher movers reporting two or more problems with their housing fell. It was 84 percent at the baseline and in 2005 it was just 24 percent. Fully 82
percent of the respondents reported that their new housing was better than where they lived before they moved. This figure is about 10 percentage points higher than the average for the other four non-Chicago sites (Buron, Levy, and Gallagher, 2007).

Residents' reports indicated satisfaction with their new housing. The NORC survey found that "most leaseholders (84%, n=513 of 611) indicated that their unit was in excellent or good condition when they moved in."

Popkin and Cunningham (2002) report that, "Movers perceive substantial improvements in their housing and neighborhood conditions." According to the NORC survey report (2007), 27% of leaseholders responded that what they "liked best" about living outside of public housing was that they had a "nicer apartment." Twenty-five percent responded that they liked the "safer neighborhood" best. Moreover, residents using vouchers in the private market report more satisfaction with their living conditions than residents living in public housing. Researchers compared leaseholders in CHA housing to those using HCV (excluding those temporarily living in unsubsidized housing), and found that those using HCV stated more often that their current neighborhood was better. While this difference was not statistically significant, others report similar findings. Venkatesh and Celimli’s survey (2004) found that 58% of the residents living in private market units reported being happy with their new private-market housing unit. Finally, as Boston’s draft study noted (2009), the growing use of Housing Choice Vouchers "created the greatest improvement in the quality of neighborhoods where families reside."

**Neighborhood Poverty Level**

Despite movers' general satisfaction with housing quality, the research is mixed when assessing changes in neighborhood poverty level in the neighborhoods where residents reside. Buron et al. (2007) reported from the Panel Study that, "many public housing residents also moved to lower-poverty neighborhoods." However, just 12 percent lived in a neighborhood with poverty rates below 20 percent. Moreover, 34 percent still lived in extremely high-
poverty neighborhoods (neighborhoods with poverty rates higher than 40 percent). Lewis and Singa (2007), using data from the Illinois Families Study (IFS), between 1999 and 2002, found that "despite significant residential mobility, there was only a slight reduction in the economic segregation of sample members."

Studies that addressed the Plan for Transformation specifically reported similarly mixed results. In a 2002 study, Fischer concluded that while Housing Choice Voucher relocatees moved to areas that were, in general, less poor and with higher median incomes, "in the larger citywide context, most locatees are still moving to areas of economic despair." Similarly, Popkin and Cunningham (2002) found that "movers are living in lower-poverty neighborhoods than their original public housing developments, but these neighborhoods are still high-poverty." Venkatesh, using a dataset that recorded the geographic outcomes of all Chicago public housing families who relocated during 2003, found that 97% of all CHA families who relocated to the private market moved to a neighborhood with poverty levels greater than 23.49%. Boston’s draft report (2009), examining data over several years, provides figures less extreme than those reported by Venkatesh for 2003, but also finds that large numbers of households relocated to neighborhoods with poverty rates above that threshold. Among the 3,402 still active 10-99 families who relocated from public housing developments after 1999 and held Housing Choice Vouchers as of 2007, the average neighborhood poverty rate had decreased over 20 percentage points, from 46.9% in 1999 to 26.0% in 2007. Again, despite the marked improvement, this cut at the data still shows neighborhood poverty rates above 25%. These communities are in direct violation of the CHA’s own standards for effective relocation sites, which specify that poverty rates must below 23.5 percent (Sullivan, 2003). Lewis and Sinha (2007) found only a slight reduction in the economic segregation of their sample members. Fischer (2002) found that families tended to move to high-poverty census tracts, and that the pattern did not change significantly for those making subsequent moves. Hyra (2008), in his study of the changes to the Bronzeville neighborhood, argues that, “The public housing demolition in Chicago has relocated neighborhood poverty, not alleviated it. The vast majority of residents are moving to new, segregated and disadvantaged neighborhoods further from the city center” (p. 92).
By 2005, however, the situation appeared to be improving for some Right of Return residents. About one-third of Chicago movers in the Panel Study were living in neighborhoods that were less than 20 percent poor. Popkin cautions that, "this figure was somewhat lower than the average for the other four sites." In Chicago and the other study sites, fewer than 1 in 5 former public housing residents were still living in extremely high poverty—neighborhoods with poverty rates of 40 percent or above.

Despite relocation, many residents remain in racially segregated neighborhoods. As the Gautreaux case established, the CHA had been discriminating against black tenants by concentrating them in large-scale developments located in poor, black neighborhoods. According to Popkin et al. (2000), "Now, 30 years after the initial decision, the philosophy behind Gautreaux, that public housing and assisted housing should be scattered throughout a range of communities or ‘deconcentrated,’ has become a driving force behind the current transformation." However, many conclude that there has been little change in racial segregation. According to Popkin (2010) nearly all HCV holders "have moved to areas that were predominantly African-American." These findings for Chicago are consistent with those from the Resident Satisfaction Survey, conducted during the same period (see Rasinski et al., 2010; National Opinion Research Center, 2007). Thus, while there have been other changes in neighborhood composition for movers, such as lower poverty rates, the Plan for Transformation has not led to racial deconcentration. Fischer (2003), in a study of Housing Choice Voucher holders found that, "Moving with an HCV has not reduced racial isolation significantly." At the time of his study, eighty percent of those relocating were residing in communities that were over 90 percent black, and nearly 70 percent of residents leaving the high-rises with vouchers were going to neighborhoods where the poverty rate was above 23 percent (Fischer 2003). Venkatesh and Celimli's 2004 study found that, "97% of all CHA families who relocated to the private market moved to a neighborhood with African-American population greater than 30%." While the racial composition of these communities violates of the CHA’s own standards for effective relocation sites, tenants appear to exercise a preference for the city’s African-American neighborhoods. Specifically, the majority wishes to live in Chicago’s middle-class African-American communities (Venkatesh and Celimni, 2004). As Popkin and Cunningham (2002) put it, "Movers are living in lower-poverty neighborhoods
than their original public housing developments, but these neighborhoods are still segregated.

This outcome is not unique to the Plan for Transformation. Evidence from the five-city Panel Study showed that while the new neighborhoods residents live in are slightly more racially diverse, "the average minority concentration only declined from 92 to 87 percent" (Buron, 2004). While Boston's 2009 draft study does not include racial composition when assessing destination neighborhoods, those that do include race as a variable find few changes in racial composition.

Results from mobility counseling initiatives to encourage residents to move to lower poverty neighborhood show mixed results for participants. In 2002, the CHA launched the Gautreaux Two housing mobility program. The program aimed to help CHA families move to neighborhoods with less poverty and more racial diversity than their public housing neighborhoods. Families were encouraged to move to neighborhoods that qualified as Opportunity Areas (defined as census tract levels with no more than 23.49 percent of residents living in poverty and no more than 30 percent black residents). However, in a study of Gautreaux Two, Pashup et al. (2005) described the tenants' search and moving process as "complex." Implementation was made difficult due to obstacles residents faced, both personal and procedural. Consequently, eighteen months after the program began, only about one-third of the 549 families who enrolled in the program succeeded in moving through the Gautreaux Two program. The obstacles residents faced, including a tight rental market and landlord discrimination, are similar to the roadblocks other residents encounter when attempting to use vouchers. Additionally, Pashup et al. (2005) reported that, "specific aspects of program implementation also impeded moving." These included limited follow-up counseling and miscommunication between clients and program counselors, problems similar to those found in the relocation counseling for the entire 10-1-1999 population during the early years. Additionally, researchers were "surprised" by the small number of participants from buildings slated for demolition. Just one-third of the participants came from buildings slated for demolition (Pashup et al., 2005).

The Housing Opportunity Program (HOP) was created in 1999 with the overall goal to help families move to Opportunity Neighborhoods. The Program is available to the entire CHA
voucher population, not just the subset of 10-1-1999 households with such vouchers. From 1999 to 2005, approximately 10,000 Housing Choice Voucher holders have enrolled in HOP (Cunningham and Sawyer, 2005). Cunningham and Sawyer report that those residents who participated in HOP and receive mobility services are significantly more likely to move to opportunity neighborhoods. “After controlling for household characteristics and pre-program address, participants who receive mobility services are 52 percent more likely to move to opportunity neighborhoods than those who do not receive assistance." This finding held even after researchers controlled for background differences that might have influenced whether or not a family moves to an opportunity area (income, household size, etc.), so it seems clear that the program has a strong effect. Yet a number of factors influence participants' moves to opportunity areas. For example, researchers found that generally, slightly more advantaged households are more likely to move to opportunity areas. For example, higher-income, wage-earning households are more likely to move to opportunity neighborhoods. Economically stable families are more likely to move to opportunity neighborhoods. And when compared with their unemployed counterparts, researchers found that households with wage earners are 13 percent more likely to move to opportunity neighborhoods. Additionally, as household income increases, so too does the likelihood that a household will move to an opportunity neighborhood. For example, "for every $1,000 increase in income, the household is 6 percent more likely to move to an opportunity neighborhood" (Cunningham and Sawyer, 2005, p.7). Conversely, disadvantaged households are less likely to move to opportunity neighborhoods. Large families requiring more bedrooms are less likely to move to opportunity neighborhoods. According to (Cunningham and Sawyer, 2005) regression analysis showed that as household size increased by one bedroom, the probability that the family would move to a low-poverty neighborhood was reduced by 11 percent. Additionally, researchers found that black households are 62 percent less likely to move to opportunity neighborhoods than white and Hispanic voucher households. Most relevant to research on the Plan for Transformation, however, is the fact that the authors found that public housing relocatees were less likely to move to low-poverty neighborhoods. Approximately "3,712 public housing relocatees entered the Housing Choice Voucher Program between 2001 and 2004, accounting for 12.7 percent of voucher participants during this period." Only 29 percent of public housing relocatees moved to low-poverty neighborhoods, and over half (52 percent) moved to neighborhoods with
poverty rates exceeding 40 percent (Cunningham and Sawyer, 2005). From this study it appears as though residents displaced by the Plan for Transformation are at the greatest risk of failing to make opportunity moves.

**Other neighborhood issues: Economic growth for neighborhoods**

In many instances, the Plan for Transformation has led to gains for homeowners and businesses, including minorities. Hyra (2007) contrasts this with the Urban Renewal that took place in Chicago from 1940-1960, noting that the earlier rounds primarily benefited real estate developers and other profit-seeking firms owned by whites. "Today, however," he writes, "certain African American businesses are benefiting." These include black-owned development, management and construction companies that stand to benefit from the Plan for Transformation. Additionally, property values have increased in neighborhoods with revitalized housing. This benefits property owners in these neighborhoods, including homeowners. Hyra finds that middle and upper-income black homeowners in Bronzeville, the site of both the former Robert Taylor Homes and Stateway Gardens, stand to benefit financially as well, once the neighborhood investments boost housing prices. However, Hyra notes that the property values were increasing in Bronzeville's prior to the implementation of the Plan for Transformation; once demolition began, development activity and interest in the area accelerated. Thus, Hyra concludes that, "the new phase of urban renewal is connected to a certain level of black prosperity" (p. 96). Pattillo (2007), too, recounts how middle class black homeowners and investors gain from neighborhood investments in the North Kenwood/Oakland neighborhood.

Hartley (2008) also found evidence that public housing demolitions led to increases in home sale prices, residential construction, and, to a lesser extent, employment within neighborhoods where public housing was demolished. He calculated a 20% to 25% increase in median home prices and a 30% to 40% rise in residential unit construction in Chicago neighborhoods where high-rise public housing was demolished. Hartley concluded that demolishing large public housing developments had elevated nearby property values. Furthermore, Hartley (2008) found that the relationship of home prices increasing with distance from high-rise public
housing developments, present in the year 2000, disappeared by the year 2006, when a large fraction of Chicago’s high-rise public housing stock had been demolished.

The flipside of prosperity for some has been hardship for others. Along with the economic gains for neighborhoods, lower income families have found them less accessible. As Boston (2009) notes, a reduction in housing units available to poor families has taken place during the Plan for Transformation: "In Chicago, a significant reduction in the number of housing opportunities occurred between 2000 and 2007." "While revitalization increased property values,” Boston’s draft study observed, “it also reduced the level of affordability within the community” (p. 15).

**Impacts on Crime**

Hartley (2008) examined the local effect of public housing demolition on neighborhoods where high-rise public housing was demolished in Chicago. He found that public housing demolitions were associated with large reductions in neighborhood violent crime. He concluded that public housing demolitions led to a decrease of about 11.5 murders per year per high-rise public housing neighborhood. For the eight neighborhoods that contained high-rise public housing, this represents a decrease of about 90 murders per year from a pre-demolition average of 170 murders per year, a roughly 53% drop. He also calculated that violent crimes other than murder dropped by 20% to 40% in neighborhoods where high-rise public housing was demolished. The estimates for rape "translate to about 140 fewer rapes per year, or a 27% decrease from the pre-demolition average of 520 rapes per year. Estimates for assault indicate a fall of about 1,715 per year, or 30% due to demolitions. Robberies fall by about 2,600 (42%). Crimes involving guns fall by about 2,020 per year (37%). Personal crimes in street locations fall by about 3,065 per year (26%)."

Hartley also attempted to calculate displacement of violent crime due to public housing demolition, using a panel of cities that received HOPE VI demolition grants. He found that demolitions were associated with reductions in city-wide murder rates. This suggested that any increase in murder due to displacement is smaller in magnitude than decreases in murder.
in neighborhoods that are directly affected by public housing demolitions. He concluded that violent crime displacement due to public housing demolition is likely to be small (Hartley, 2008). A program of high-rise public housing demolition, in the years immediately following the policy, appears to have been an effective method to reduce crime, both in the neighborhood and throughout the city.

Assessments of neighborhood quality, poverty level, and crime—both for former project sites and for sites to which CHA residents relocated as the Plan was implemented—show improvements in some areas and continued challenges in others. The research so far suggests that most of those who have moved as the result of the Plan for Transformation have found themselves living in neighborhoods that are safer but only marginally less poor.
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