department
programs
degrees
Cross-Cutting
My overall interest is in identifying new and better ways of managing transboundary
water resources. Better, in my view, means maximizing the sustainable
use of water at a reasonable cost while ensuring that the urgent
water needs of all water users (that is, city residents, farmers and industrial
developers) are met simultaneously. This has to happen while ecosystem
services are maintained. In most parts of the world, eff orts inspired
by Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) do not meet these
objectives.
Within each country, national and state governments set water- management
goals and provide the infrastructure needed to meet them. They fund these
eff orts with general tax revenues or rely on dedicated water tariff s and fees
to do so. Government agencies try to coordinate public and private eff orts
to deliver water to urban dwellers, manage wastewater, provide water for
food production and manage the water necessary to produce and distribute
energy. They must have the capacity to get bureaucrats at multiple levels to
work together, either by off ering them fi nancial incentives or by exercising the
authority required to ensure compliance. In most instances, they have trouble
doing both.
Managing waters that cross international boundaries is even more diffi -
cult. Nations are sovereign. While international laws call for the sharing of
transboundary waters, it is sometimes diffi cult to force countries to comply.
However, most governments comply, most of the time, with most transboundary
agreements because they do not want to lose their credibility (and they do
not want to be forced out of other international regimes that are important
to them). This is generally referred to as “compliance without enforcement”
(Chayes and Chayes 1991 ). The water- sharing agreements that work best are
those that meet the interests of the (people in the) states involved and do not
require much enforcement.
Water management within a country and water diplomacy across international
borders depend on the problem- solving capabilities of the political entities
involved, especially when the self- interests of the parties are not aligned.
Water management (that is, operational eff orts to implement laws, policies
and programs that water diplomacy generates) is only eff ective when allocation
and investment decisions are made in a timely fashion, parties who stand
to be aff ected by decisions are engaged in monitoring the results and helping
revise decisions, staff capacity is suffi cient and long- term relationships (especially
trust) among relevant stakeholders are maintained or enhanced. Water
diplomacy, in contrast, is usually judged to be successful when the actions of
institutional actors are viewed as legitimate by those aff ected by them, decisions
take account of local knowledge and agency discretion (in the face of
unanticipated events) is exercised wisely. Let us examine two hypothetical
cases to understand why and how water diplomacy and water management
often fall short.
Title | |
Publication Type | Journal Article |
Year of Publication | 2017 |
Authors | Susskind L |
Journal | Water Security in the Middle East: Essays in Scientific and Social Cooperation |
Volume | 1 |
Start Page | 185-205 |
Date Published | 01/2017 |
ISBN Number | 978-1-78308-566-8 |
Abstract | My overall interest is in identifying new and better ways of managing transboundary water resources. Better, in my view, means maximizing the sustainable use of water at a reasonable cost while ensuring that the urgent water needs of all water users (that is, city residents, farmers and industrial developers) are met simultaneously. This has to happen while ecosystem services are maintained. In most parts of the world, eff orts inspired by Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) do not meet these objectives. Within each country, national and state governments set water- management goals and provide the infrastructure needed to meet them. They fund these eff orts with general tax revenues or rely on dedicated water tariff s and fees to do so. Government agencies try to coordinate public and private eff orts to deliver water to urban dwellers, manage wastewater, provide water for food production and manage the water necessary to produce and distribute energy. They must have the capacity to get bureaucrats at multiple levels to work together, either by off ering them fi nancial incentives or by exercising the authority required to ensure compliance. In most instances, they have trouble doing both. Managing waters that cross international boundaries is even more diffi - cult. Nations are sovereign. While international laws call for the sharing of transboundary waters, it is sometimes diffi cult to force countries to comply. However, most governments comply, most of the time, with most transboundary agreements because they do not want to lose their credibility (and they do not want to be forced out of other international regimes that are important to them). This is generally referred to as “compliance without enforcement” (Chayes and Chayes 1991 ). The water- sharing agreements that work best are those that meet the interests of the (people in the) states involved and do not require much enforcement. Water management within a country and water diplomacy across international borders depend on the problem- solving capabilities of the political entities involved, especially when the self- interests of the parties are not aligned. Water management (that is, operational eff orts to implement laws, policies and programs that water diplomacy generates) is only eff ective when allocation and investment decisions are made in a timely fashion, parties who stand to be aff ected by decisions are engaged in monitoring the results and helping revise decisions, staff capacity is suffi cient and long- term relationships (especially trust) among relevant stakeholders are maintained or enhanced. Water diplomacy, in contrast, is usually judged to be successful when the actions of institutional actors are viewed as legitimate by those aff ected by them, decisions take account of local knowledge and agency discretion (in the face of unanticipated events) is exercised wisely. Let us examine two hypothetical cases to understand why and how water diplomacy and water management often fall short. |
URL | http://www.oapen.org/download?type=document&docid=626411#page=200 |